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INTRODUCTION
Tho early American philosopher Alexander Bryan Johnson,
born in Gosport, England in 1786, is said to have anticipated
the ideas of Ernst Mach, Charles Sanders Peirce, P. W. Bridg-
man, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Moritz Schlick, Rudolph Carnap, C. K.
Ogden, I. E. Richards, Alfred Korzybski and the entire school
of logical positivism.-1 Johnson was himself convinced that the
recognition of his insights into the philosophy of language,
which he originally presented in public lectures before the
Utica Lyceum in 1825, and later organized into a book titled
The Philosophy of Human Knowledge , r,
(
.
Treatis Language
,
would "ultimately accomplish a great revolution in every branch
of learning. "2 Revolutionary developments in the philosophy of
language, however, are usually attributed to the independent
efforts of the logical positivists, the pragmatists, the ordin-
ary language school and other contemporary groups, but curiously
enough never to Johnson's work; in spite of three subsequent
revisions published under different titles, it was ignored by
his contemporaries and remained in oblivion for more than one
hundred years until resuscitated by David Rynin in recent times.
Thus August Compte, tho French positivist, refused to consider
^•David Rynin, "Introduction," in Alexander 3ryan Johnson,"
A Treatise on Lar. , ed., David Rynin, (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1947), pp. 20-23. Charles I. C-lickber.
quoted in David Rynin ed.,
_
Irer on 7. .-.--y r-e
, ]3, cit .
,
(1959), rear cover.
^Johnson, A ed, David Rynin, (Berkeley:
University of California P"ress]j 19^9) , P. ij-0 (Leo. I, par. 111-).
2Johnson's work and submitted it to one of his disciples for
examination. Of the first book Frances Wright remarks: "The
book received no praise, nor censure, nor perusal. I seek not
to animate the dead."^ Nevertheless, Johnson issued a revised
and enlarged edition in I836, which he called Treatise yn
Language , rr The Relation Which VIore. 2 Bear to Things . This
second edition created no more excitement than the first, though
it drew criticisms on account of its alleged heretical character.
Horace 3ushnell, for example, deplored that "to language in its
more comprehensive sense, as a vehicle of spirit, thought, senti-
ment, /Johnson/ appears to have scarcely directed his inquiries. "3
And a lengthy review by Timothy Flint, although praising Johnson
for having produced a "singular, learned and acute work/' criti-
cized adversely the author's treatment of natural theology .*+
Johnson apparently took these criticisms to heart, for in his
third edition, which appeared under the title The
Words , etc . , he made some important emendations of his central
doctrine which he hoped would justify theological discourse.
Moreover, in a fourth work, Th Physiology
_
>f the Senses , etc .
,
•^•Quoted from a letter by August Compte . David Rynin, "Intro-
duction, " OJD. jcit. , (1959), p. 6.
2
Frances Wright, A Discourse on Language . Quoted in David
Rynin, "Introduction," op. clt
., (I9IJT), p. 6.
3Horace Bushnell, God in Chris t. Quoted in Stillman Drake,
"A. B. Johnson and His Works on Language," TC, Review ' r ral
Semantics
, Vol. I, p. 239.
k
Timothy Flint, The Western Hon Review
. Quoted in David
Rynin, "Introduction, n
[
g. c i
t
. ,
("194-7"), p. 7.
published in 1856, ho attempted to clarify and systematize in
an almost geometric fashion many of the important ideas of his
earlier writings. Whether these attempts to defend his doctrines
wore successful may be doubted, but the lack of public attention
that his works suffered for the next century may be some indica-
tion of the continuing displeasure of the readers he had among
learned divines and other contemporaries.
There are other reasons, however, tending to account for
Johnson's lack of popularity both in former and more recent
time3. It is probable, for instance, in view of the fact that
British Empiricism was relatively unknown in America, that
Johnson would have been accorded the recognition he deserved
had he published his works in England rather than America.
Also, Johnson's works were published in small editions which
did not receive a wide circulation. Stillman Drake, who reprinted
by hand an edition of forty-two copies of Johnsons lSij.6 publication,
believes that
the similarity of his works to those of the semanti-
cists, although astonishingly close, seems to have escaped
comment
—
perhaps because of^ the scarcity of Johnson's books
after a century of neglect. ±
Stimulated in part by Drake's interest in Johnson, David
Rynin produced a conflation of Johnson's first two books in 19i|-7,
to which he added a preface explaining his method of organization,
an introduction containing a brief account of Johnson's life and
Stillman Drake, "A. 3. Johnson and His Works on Language,"
ETC , Review * Gc v. ". a, Vol. I, p. 239
hwritings, a critical essay in which Rynin criticizes Johnson's
ideas, and an appendix in which he identifies Johnson's
unquoted sources. 1 Rynin' s edition was favorably received
by critics who found merit both in Johnson's semantics as well
as in Rynin' s own contributions, John Eospers, for example,
wrote that Johnson's Treatise "is still the best book on
semantics thus far written in America.' Ke explains:
If this is semantics , it is semantics in a much
more profound sense than that practised by the bulk
of twentieth century semanticists , most of whom have
(to all appearances) never grasped the import of the
points that Johnson was trying to make.
And Hospers adds:
Johnson's views have tremendous philosophical
implications, which he himself constantly draws. (It
is safe to say that many subsequent philosophers who ,
never heard of Johnson were refuted by him in advance.
Of Rynin' s critical essay Hospers declares that it is
"both thorough and appreciative, "4 while another writer has
said of the entire work (i_. e», Johnson's first two books and
Rynin' s critical essay) that it represents "the best available
introduction to logical positivism. "5
1
A paper-bound edition of this work appeared in 1959 without
the critical essay but with a new introduction.
2
Quoted in David Rynin ed.,
<
.
Treatise l Language
, (1959),
rear cover.
3John Hospers, "Review," Philosophical Review, Vol. 57,
P. 181.
Loc . cit .
5Eurnham P. Beckwith, Religion, Philosophy and Science s ;
York: Philosophical Library, 1957) * p. o.
5Rynln'a edition unfortunately does not contain any of the
material of either The Meaning of Words or the important
Physiology of th Senses , a book of remarkable organization
illuminating much that is unclear in earlier writings. These
omissions are questionable in an edition which is alleged to
contain "the core of Johnson's philosophical views,"* because
not only is his early position significantly augmented and
expanded in later writings, it is also fully appreciated and
understood only in the light of the latter.
The following chapters are intended to do justice to all
of Johnson's works on semantics. Though some repetition of
the ideas of the first two works occurs in later editions, I
shall consider Johnson's first two books his early work and his
last two his late work. Thus the early work corresponds to the
material presented in Rynin's conflation and, due to the fact
that this edition is easily available, most readers who are
acquainted with Johnson's ideas will probably associate them
with the early work. In his late work, which is rather difficult
to obtain, Johnson expands his theory sufficiently to make it
imperative to rescue this material from the oblivion in which
it continues to languish.
The distinction between the early and the late work is
not intended to imply that there exists any radical alteration
John Hospers, Ice. cit
.
or reversal of the early theory in later writings. The
classification is a mere convenience suggested partially by
a time lapse between the writings of these two sets of books,
during which Johnson must have realized that his precocious
theory was not yet capable of introducing "a revolution in
every branch of learning," and that some revision and
expansion was necessary. This expansion, however, is little
more than a logical following out of ideas he had entertained
and interests he had demonstrated in the early work.
I suspect that the lack of understanding alluded to by
Hospers is due partially to Johnson's failure to provide a
clear and precise exposition of his ideas especially in the
early work. The deficiency though mitigated to some extent in
The Physiology of the Senses , was clearly prevalent in The
Meaning of Words . Johnson was himself aware that his doctrines
might possibly be misunderstood. He wrote in his preface:
...all that the book contains is the elucidation
of but one percept ; namely, to interpret language by
nature... The percept itself which I have sought to
illustrate, I profoundly respect j but whether I have
demonstrated its importance, the publick must determine.
Amid active and extensive employments, and with no
external stimulus to literary pursuits, I shall be
satisfied if the succeeding discourses shall commend
the doctrine to the efforts of men whose understandings
are more comprehensive than mine, and whose labours the
world is accustomed to respect.
1
Johnson was no philosopher, at least not by profession,
and according to Drake, had no formal education beyond the age
Quoted in Stillman Drake, d. cit
. , p. 238*
of fifteen. One must marvel all the more at Johnson's
astounding accomplishment in creating a philosophy of language
which compares favorably with the work of such predecessors as
John Locke, Bishop Berkeley and David Hume. He approaches hi3
subject with the tenacity of a scientist, and he is perhaps
more literally an empiricist such as Bacon visualized than were
his predecessors with their traditional arm-chair procedure.
The result is not always a clear exposition of his ideas; and
though the evidence which ha copiously adduces is intuitively
compelling, his examples are so typical of linguistic fallacies
that there is a danger of assenting too readily to the ideas
which they are designed to illustrate.
Johnson differs from his empiricist ancestors primarily
in his emphasis on detailed analysis of language as a propae-
deutic to the resolution of philosophical disputes. A "new
sort of logic and critic" is what Johnson purports to have
developed, but not a new theory to settle the questions of
preceding rival theories. He is proud of his approach and
confident in its success:
To fix the fluctuating mass of theories, no man
has suggested any other expedient than the construction
of some new theory, to whose authority all persons
shall submit. The remedy is constantly augmenting the
disease. I shall not imitate so unsuccessful a
proceduro .2
Ibid.
,
p. 2£l .
2John
par. i|)
.
son,
i
,
Treat if
________> 2» £££•» P* 31 (Lee. 1,
8Though In some ways Johnson's achievements parallel those
of Immanuel Kant, in that both were faced with the disputes of
rationalism and empiricism, and both formulized solutions to
many of these, the two philosophers' procedures are radically
divergent. Kant fancied that by an ingenious synthesis of
competing philosophical systems he had solved all the hoary
metaphysical puzzles of his time. Johnson, In an entirely
different and perhaps more effective manner, "solves" problems
by demonstrating that they frequently rest on simple linguistic
confusions. He has thereby effected a Copernican Revolution
all his own, and he expresses this succinctly In his repeated
assertion that we should interpret language by nature, not
nature by languages Johnson's procedure is threefold: it
consists of (a) a construction of a phenomenological nominalism
based on empiricist tenets; (b) an analysis of language, and a
formulation of basic linguistic principles; and (c), a supple-
mentation of a wealth of examples and illustrations, adduced
in a scientific manner from ordinary as well as learned
discourse.
Any critical evaluation of Johnson's accomplishments must
be preceded by an organization, clarification and interpretation
of the materials My approach will In general deal with Johnson's
work within his conceptual frameitfork., within his contemporary
setting, employing his own terminology and avoiding, as far as
possible, the web of intricacies, distinctions and jargon of
modern semantics. It would be unfair to estimate Johnson's
work solely in relation to modern semantical notions 3inco
this can easily result in misunderstanding of the work under
consideration, as well as a reduction of it to modern theories,
Contempoprary ideas are usually out of character in the
consideration of classical material. It is possible, for
example, to criticize Johnson for his failure to utilize the
use-mention distinction, a convention helpful in distinguishing
names from objects named. Johnson tells us, for instance, that
a rose is a word, without realizing that a hundred years later
arbitrary conventions will require that such an assertion be
written "A 'rose' is a word," rather than "A rose is a word."
In Johnson's writings, however, it is nearly always contextually
clear whether he is speaking of words or objects, and hence to
point out the conventions of later writers is surely trivial
criticism. Indeed, the objection appears specious when we
realize that the distinction between words and objects is
precisely what Johnson has labored to demonstrate throughout
his entire work'.
Again, to dismiss the interesting notion of an intellec-
tion, which Johnson introduces in his later work, because it
rests on the confusion between stating and expressing meanings,
a distinction which he nowhere makes, is entirely mistaken. An
interpretation of this notion in the light of the entire
doctrine, on the other hand, indicates that it is not an
:
hoc
supplementation in Johnson's later theory, but an insight
consistent with the earlier one.
10
My interpretation of Johnson's work shall be guided by
his recommendation:
As, however j the following sheets are the painful
elaboration of many years, when my language or position
shall, in a casual perusal, seem absurd, (and such
cases may be frequent), I request the reader to seek
some mors creditable interpretation * The best which he
can conceive should be assumed to be my intention. . • •*-
Occasional criticism which the reader of this paper
encounters is intended not to subvert but to interpret a
possible alternative rendition of an idea in Johnson's doctrine;
nor is it intended to alter or improve the theory but to help
clarify and systematize it. My paper is thus more than an
attempt to present some little-known facts about an aspect of
the history of Anglo-American philosophy; yet it is not an
attempt to expound the one and only correct philosophy of
language
o
I shall limit my inquiry to an investigation of words and
their meanings, while ignoring propositions, time and space not
permitting a thorough examination of both topics . This limit-
ation is necessary in the first and third chapters which deal
more specifically with Johnson's semantics than the second
chapter, which is an inquiry into some general questions
concerning language and knowledge.
The first chapter is an attempt or organize, clarify and
interpret Johnson's major ideas expressed in the Treatise. I
Johnson, "Preface,"
, t Treatise on language , >o. cit . , p. 28.
11
havo occasionally drawn relevant material from Tl
of the Senses , and my exposition of Johnson's theorems which
form the basis of his epistemology is suggested by the
organization of the latter work*
Johnson, who opens his Treatise with the assertion that
he is neither original nor interested in anything but an applica-
tion of prevalent notions, manages in the course of his book to
advance empiricist thought to some degree. And though he is
primarily engaged in a fascinating application of his ideas to
the solution of philosophical problems and disputes, to the
elimination of vacuous queries and to the clarification of
concepts, he succeeds in developing an epistemology which, in
spite of its weaknesses, is an original contribution.
The first section of Chapter I deals exclusively with this
epistemology, in particular with Johnson's ontology, or his
conception of the universe which is governed by his theory of
perception, The second section is concerned with a number of
problems arising through misuse of language and through our
inattention to the theorems explained in the first section. The
third section is devoted to a discussion of the relation of
reference that obtains between words and objects, and to the
meaning of words.
The theory disclosed in the Treatise suggests a number of
interesting questions which I discuss in the second chapter.
Corroboration for some of the solutions to these questions, which
I suggest in the course of that discussion, is found in Johnson's
12
later writings. Finally, in the third chapter, I discuss
Johnson's bookj The Meaning of 1-Jor- ' :. 3 with particular emphasis
on the notion of an intellection which play3 an important role
in this work. Intellections are a significant extension of
Johnson's earlier system of semantics, and they are instrumental
in his development of a more mature philosophy of language
CHAPTER I
WORDS, OBJECTS AND TH3IR RELATION: THE EARLY CONCEPTION
In the present chapter I shall present an interpretation
of Alexander Bryan Johnson's early work on the theory of
reference, i.e., the relation which obtains between words and
objects. The material of this chapter will form the basis for
a wider study, in the second chapter, of language as a tool in
the acquisition of knowledge. In the course of the present
discussion I shall attempt to clarify Johnson' 3 position,
organize his major ideas, examine some ambiguities, and elucidate
important assumptions, some of which Johnson employs as criteria
in his classification of the universe, and some as major
linguistic principles,,
Johnson's treatment of language is divided into three parts:
the first part is concerned with his conception of the universe,
or with the set of all entities to which a language might make
reference; the second part deals with his conception of words,
or with the set of all entities which are capable of referring
to objects in the universe; the third part deals with the relation
of reference itself and with the conditions under which it can
obtain between linguistic entities examined in the second part
and entities in the universe as described in the first part.
YJe shall find that Johnson is preoccupied more with the
nature of the reference of words than iv,T ith these words or with
the relation of reference itself. He deals with language only
to demonstrate that it "possesses limited powers... and to define
lit.
the limits' of it. Since language, according to Johnson's
theory, has only one power or function, namely that of being
capable of referring us to objects, to determine the limita-
tions of language is to determine the range of its reference.
In other words, we must examine the universe to determine what
exists to which language may refer. Such contemplation of the
universe is essential to an understanding of the relation of
reference itself. Johnson observes that "To understand the
relation which words bear to created existences, we must
contemplate creation apart from words."
But to contemplate creation apart from words and yet
explain the results of such contemplation in words engenders
certain problems, among which are precisely those difficulties
in language which the Treatise endeavours to point out.
Because referents and meanings are identical in Johnson's
theory, we cannot obtain the meaning of words unless we examine
meaning apart from words. And in order to examine them we must
nearly always utilize our sense organs. Hence -to understand
the meaning of a word we must first be guided or referred by
the word to its meaning or referent, and then apprehend that
referent by means of one or more of our senses. Explanation
in the usual sense is therefore not possible in Johnson's
Johnson,
_
Treatise on 1". :--;u.-.:;e , op . cit . , p. 32 (Lee. I,
par. k) .
2
Ibid., p. 47 (Lee. II, par. Ij.) .
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theory. A set of words cannot bo used to explain their
meanings because explaining a meaning usually means to reveal
that meaning, and nothing can reveal meanings but cur sense
organs.
Thus from the beginning we must regard Johnson's own
writings not as an explanation of their subject matter, but aa
a mere reference to it. Like any other verbal disquisition,
the Treatise can do no more than refer us to its meanings, or
referents, and ultimately to comprehend these referents
requires us to transcend its language and contemplate them,
employing the only appropriate tool available in any pursuit
of knowledge, namely, our sense organs. The significance of
these ideas, which are unclear at this point, will be recognized
in what follows
•
The Content of Creation as Revealed by our Senses
Johnson's conception of the universe is expounded in the
second lecture of the Treatise , but is developed throughout the
remainder of the work, particularly in Lecture XI in which
internal feelings are explained; and it is further elucidated
in Thj Physiology of the Senses. Several fundamental distinctions
are helpful in the classification of what, for Johnson, can be
said to exist. The distinctions directly relevant here are the
following:
The terms "universe," "nature," "reality," and "creation"
are used synonymously throughout the Treatise ,
16
(a) Tho universe consists of verbal and sensible
objects
.
(b) These objects may belong to either the external
or the interna , universe.
(c) Relative to any knower these objects may be
subjective or objective ,
(d) Objects may bp further characterized as particular
or universal . •*-
The first distinction between verbal and sensible objects
is a functional one: everything that is to be found in the
universe enjoys equal status , is equally important and deserves
equal consideration. But a sub-class of objects may be used to
signify, to name, to designate, to mean, to be the signs of, or
2to refer to the remainder of existing objects. The objects of
this sub-class are called "verbal"; everything else is called
"sensible." Johnson's terminology here is misleading for it
seems to suggest that verbal objects, such as words, are not
sensible. Johnson, however, is well aware that this is not the
case. He remarks in his sixth lecture: "Every word is a sound."
Nevertheless, he recommends in another place that we should
"regard words as merely the names of things"^ because words
"are not the realities of the universe. "^ These admonitions
For other distinctions see pages 31-32 below.
2
These terms are used synonymously in Johnson T s writings. I
shall use the term "refer" from now on, but the others will
occur in quotations.
3lbid
. , p. £[{. (Lee. II, par. 22),
^•Ibid., p. 172 (Lee. XII , par. 11;).
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make sense only if we regard the distinction as a functional
and not as an epis temological one. The intended distinction
is this, that relative to a given relation of reference,
"verbal" objects are ones which refer and "sensible" objects
are ones which arc referred to. Hence both verbal objects
and sensible objects may be referred to, but only verbal
objects refer.
The distinction is useful in the tise . Later, in T
Kcaning of v/ords and also in The; -jjology * t he Sense s
,
Johnson speaks of the natural language of our senses, in which
sensible objects may also be signs of, or refer to, other
objects. He observes, for example:
Our sensible perceptions constitute thus an
unverbal language common to all men, and more
important by far than Latin and Greek .1
Thus when a doctor hears certain sounds produced by the
heart, the sounds are signs of a disorder which he recognizes;
and these sounds are said to refer him to the disorder . The
distinction between verbal and sensible objects at this point
is simply this, that verbal objects are words while sensible
2
objects are what we see, feel, taste, smell and hear. Verbal
objects are no longer singled out as capable of functioning
referentially , though of course they may do so, because sensible
Johnson, The Meaning 3 : , itc, (New York: Apple ton <5:
Co., 1862), p. 94
2
Another difference found in connection with this distinction
is a change of terminology. In later wri . a Johnson uaes the
term "unverbal" in place of "sensible." See page 135 below.
10
objects can also refer.
The distinction between verbal and sensible objects can
be extended to include types of meaning and types of knowledge.
Verbal meanings and sensible meanings are the referents of all
words. If a word has a sensible referent, that is, if it
refers to a sight, sound, etc., then it has sensible meaning.
But if a word refers to no sensible referent then it has verbal
meaning. Note that I have given the condition which a word must
fulfill in order to have verbal meaning in a negative way, V/hen
the distinction is applied to meanings the term "non-sensible"
is not synonymous with the term "verbal," because non-sensible
meaning is only a sub-class of verbal meaning,""
Finally, if we know verbal meanings then we have verbal
knowledge. Verbal knowledge may be gained through conversation,
reading or conceiving, in short, through the reception and
manipulation of words alone. Sensible knowledge, however, can
be provided only by our senses. Words cannot give us sensible
knowledge, except the knowledge of their own sounds: "Words can
teach us nothing but themselves." Johnson explains:
Suppose X to be a sight, taste, feel or smell which
you have never experienced, and I wish to communicate it
to you by words; the words which I utter will not be X,
but their meaning is X, and so ad infinitum ; hence X will
be still uncommunicatod to you, after you have heard all
the words I can use,
2
1
See pages 72ff below for further discussion of verbal and
sensible meaning.
Johnson, The Physiology of the j enses , ate, (New York:
Derby & Jackson, 16*56 ) , p. 30 .
'
19
Sensible knowledge may, however, be provided by other
organs than our senses. It may be provided by our emotional
organism or by what Johnson calls our "consciousness." In
relation to these organisms a second distinction is necessary.
Distinction (b) between objects which are external and
those that are internal is best regarded as a common-sense
classification of experience. Johnson i3 not advocating a
realist position as opposed to an idealist or materialist one.
The principles that he subsequently applies to objects he
wishes to apply equally to internal and external ones. The
classification is therefore dictated by convenience. It is
nevertheless not an arbitrary one for it is governed by an
analogous distinction between types of perception. In general,
perception provides us with our knowledge of the objects in
nature. In particular,
external sensible existences are susceptible of
a classification which shall refer each existence to
the sense through whose agency we acquire our knowledge
of the existence.
1
External sensible existences are so called because they
are perceived by means of the five external senses: sight, feel,
smell, hearing and taste. Internal sensible existences, or
internal feelings, are also classified, according to Johnson,
"among the information that we derive from our senses"; and,
he continues: "I adopt the term internal feelings, as it will
Johnson, A Trc ,\tisc I . -uoge , op . si
t
. , p. J4.7 (Lee. II,
heading)
.
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probably Indicate the phenomena which I wish to designate."
Johnson uses the terra '"senses" 1 in a broad way to include
emotional perception as well. He wishes to maintain, however,
that different senses are different because none can take over
the function of any other. External senses receive one type of
phenomenon; the internal sense receives a different type. Thus
what distinguishes internal feelings from other types of sense
experience is the typo of sense by which they are apprehended.
We usually distinguish external from internal phenomena by
saying that internal phenomena are in some sense private,
whereas external phenomena are public. Internal phenomena are
subjective for the individual who happens to experience them,
and only he can experience his pains, his emotions and feelings.
External phenomena, on the other hand, are public in that any
person could in principle perceive them. Johnson, however,
avoids this issue and never commits himself explicitly. Hence
there are problems in resolving some of his contentions. Vie
shall see that Johnson equates the information of our senses
with what exists, yet he does not commit himself to a clear-
cut subjectivism or solipsism. Also, Johnson suggests in a
different book that the meanings of i>rords are sometimes ideas
or thoughts: "Words as signs of ideas, can be signs to me of
only such ideas as I possess." Ideas or thoughts, however,
Ibid., p. 159 (Lee. Xj., par. 1)
2
Johnson, The Physiology of the Senses , etc., op. cit,, p. 31
21
belong to the internal universe by the criterion that they are
in some sense private events.
The question is sometines raised whether all sense
informations, not only internal feelings, are really internal,
or whether there is an inter-subjective manifold which provides
the meaning of words referring to phenomena that
_
i may
have. In some places Johnson supports the former view. Ke
writes
:
All that my senses disclose, and all that I am
conscious of experiencing within myself, constitute
the realities of nature. The rest of my knowledge
is verbal.
This seems reminiscent of Bishop Berkeley's "to be is to
be perceived", except that Johnson's statement is much more
subjective: Johnson says that "to be for is to be perceived
by me."' Thus it would appear that Johnson is a kind of
solipsist; yet we find him making statements such as the
following, which seem to imply that he is willing to speak of
physical objects, or at least of inter-subjective phenomena,
which are open to anyone's perception:
When a flash of lightning crosses the horizon, it
appears as vividly to persons around you as to you; hence
when you attach-a name to it, every person knows what the
name signifies .-'
The terms "ideas'" and "thoughts" are synonymous for
Johnson. For a discussion of the nature of thoughts see page
1+5ff below.
2
Johnson, rre. o_r
, p_. c 1
1
. , p. 173 (Lee.
XII, par. 1?)
3Ibid., p. 2pl (Lee. XX, par. 2)
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Any attempt to make Johnson' 3 position explicit here ia
doomed to failure because ho himself dismisses the entire
question as based on linguistic confusions. Thus he discour-
ages any serious pursuit of the question when he writes:
The metaphysician who concludes his book by
asserting that nothing exists exterior to his mind,
might havo concluded it by asserting that every
thing is exterior, if he had only named the objects
of his knowledge impressions instead of ideas.
1
And in a different lecture Johnson analyses the question
in a typical manner:
•Though we suppose generally that external
objects cause in other persons similar sights,
tastes, feels, sounds and smells, to those which
they produce in us, yet' say metaphysicians, 'no
man can know this with certainty.'
Apparently a mysterious contradiction exists in
the above position; for while we wonder at the alleged
want of knowledge, we are confident of a practical
possession of it. The difficulty proceeds from the
— restirction which metaphysicians place on the phrase
•to know.' The controversy relates not to nature, but
to language. What we experience will not be affected
by the phrases which we apply to it. If the phrase
: to know' shall be restricted t;o the information of my
own feeling, I cannot know how fire affects your hand;
for I cannot feel with your hand. When, however, I assert
that I know how fire affects your hand, the assertion
does not include that I can feel the operation of fire
one you. The assertion refers simply to my experience,
conjoined perhaps with various facts and expressions
that I derive from you.
2
The metaphysician deduces fantastic conclusions only because
the words which he choses, his universe of discourse, allow him
to do so. A rival metaphysician will deduce rival conclusions,
Ibid., p. 224 (Lee. XVII, par. 6)
2
Ibid
., pp. 286-287 (Lee. XXV, pars. 7-8)
equally fantastic, from a different set of words. But if "we
employ language simply to refer to phenomena, no sorious evil
can arise from the terms we adopt. "* Thus Johnson's own terms
"internal" and "external" should be dismissed if they fail to
refer us appropriately.
Distinction (c) between a subjective and an objective
universe differs from the former in that it does not attempt
to locate objects as either internal or external, but that it
does attempt to characterize objects relevant to a knower. In
this characterization of objects two things are determined: first,
whether the object exists, and second, whether it exists as an
object of knowledge relevant to any given person. The ontologic.?-
existence of objects would seem to be contingent on a knower as
much as their status as <nown objects is. Johnson (first
quotation page 21 above) indicates that perception is the guide
to what exists because our sense informations are identical with
the realities of nature. The question naturally arises whether
the existence of an object is contingent upon my_ perception, or
whether anyon e ' s perception is relevant in determining the
object's ontological status. Johnson's position here is not
entirely explicit though there is seme evidence that he would
support the second alternative. Thus he writes:
Decapitate signifies to me nothing but the phrase
'to cut off a head.' Should I unfortunately see a person
guillotined, the word decapitate might there..:..-- signify
the sight. To circumnavigate the globe, possesses with
''•Ibid., p. 22k (Loc. XVII, par. 7)-
2h
me no meaning but certain words and phrases ; but
with Anson or Cook, the meaning consisted of the
revelation of their senses ,1
Though Johnson had never perceived the sight denoted by
the word "decapitate," some persons have zecn it, and hence the
act has a real existence as much as the circumnavigation of the
globe has because the latter was perceived by Anson and Cook.
This circumnavigation is not merely a collection of words
augmented perhaps by various pictures; it is a certain event
which most certainly existed in that it occured as witnossed by
Anson and Cook. Speaking specifically of objects Johnson says:
Shipwreck signifies t_o me at present no more
than some words and paintings; but hcreaft e it m
unfortunately name a sight. 2 (my italics
)
Shipwrecks exist in spite of the fact that Johnson has
never perceived one. Similarly, the word "rod" has no sensible
meaning for a blind man though it has sensible meaning for many
other persons. Yet instances of red exist, in spite of the
blind man's lack of sight, and they exist as evidenced by the
relevant perceptions of others.
Another point is of importance here. The phrase "Contingent
on perception" does not mean that "X exists only it is per-
ceived." It means "If X exists then it is capable of being
perceived." Johnson declares: "when we employ a phrase without
referring to any discoverable existence or operation, the words
Ibid
. , p. I6I4. (Lee. XI, par. 1>) .
Ibid
. , p. 152 (Loc. X, par. 12) .
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are divested of signification, "1 (my italics) If a word ha
sensible meaning, that is, if there exists a sensible referent
to which it rofers, then it must be at least in principle
possible for -isomeon to perceive that referent.
We may nevertheless continue to speak of objects as
existing for a given person and not for other persons, but such
existence will mean only "existonce-as-ob ject-of -knowledge .
"
The color red is not an object of knowledge for that person who
has no sight, though it is an object of knowledge for those who
do have this faculty, and who have perceived and instance of
this color. Hence the color rcu ^;:ists for some, yet does not
exist for others as an object of knowledge. Moreover, the
color exists ontologically, irrespective of the blind man's
failure to perceive it, because at least one person is able to
ascertain its existence by means of his perception.
Before introducing the notion of a subjective universe
versus an objective one, I would like to introduce another
distinction in order to avoid confusion. Johnson distinguishes
the universe of phenomena from what he calls a "terra incognita"2
which consists of "objects" that no one could ever perceive.
An object exists if it belongs to the universe of phenomena,
where its existence is attested by, or can be attested by
perception. The universe of phenomena can be distinguished
Ibid
., p. 203 (Lee. XV, par. 11)
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into a subjective and an objective part. This distinction is
not to bo regarded as a real distinction (such as oho distinc-
tion between the universe of phenomena and the terra incogni
t
a)
,
but a distinction related to the question of meaningful discourse.
There is only one universe, but each person can speak signifi-
cantly of only that part of it which is for him subjective, and
with which he is acquainted through his perceptual apparatus.
The objective universe, relevant to any given person, is that
part of the universe which he has not perceived, and of which
he cannot therefore speak significantly. Thus the subjective
universe of a blind or a deaf man is considerably smaller than
that of a man in possession of all his senses. But for each
the meaning of the words which he employs to describe his
subjective universe is governed entirely by his sense information,
and the universe with which he is acquainted consists only of
that information, though, for all he knows, the objects of the
entire universe are much more numerous than the ones which he
knows
•
Johnson suspects that the reader will evince surprise at
his limited capacity for meaningful discourse;
To deem ourselves shut up in the universe with no
capacity to know or even _to speak anything of it but
what our sense s reveal seems a narrower range than we
are accustomed to attribute to our knowledge* Still,
such is our situation.! (my Italics)
Johnson, A Treatise on angua-re , op . c i t . , p. 2^0 (Lee. XIX,
par
. 17 ) .
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Though wo may indeed know or speak of only the subjective
universe, this need not imply that the subjective and the
objective universes are identical. The objective universe is
the universe of which our knowledge is steadily increasing; the
subjective universeis the universe which we know.
The standard distinction between knowledge by description
and knowledge by acquaintance is equivalent to the distinction
between knowledge of the subjective and knowledge of the
objective universes. V*"e can know the objective universe only
by description, that is, we know of it from conversation and
reading. And we can know the subjective universe only by
acquaintance, that is, we can know it through our sense organs.
Johnson himself speaks in these terms in a later work: The
theorem, "Anything which seeing informs me of, no one or more
of my senses can inform me of" helps us comprehend "the
difference which exists unverbally between knowledge that w©
obtain by seeing, and knowledge that we obtained from reading or
conversation."1 He explains that no matter how appropriately we
describe a scene, the description communicates only verbal
knowledge but no sensible knowledge. Thus Johnson's distinction
between verbal and sensible knowledge is essentially the same
as the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and know-
pledge by description.
1
Johnson, The : -. ; v. ; r, . .:•-- of the Sensor: , op . c i t . , p. 23.
2
For further discussion of this distinction see pp. 109ff
below.
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The final distinction, distinction (d), that must be
made is that between particulars (or individuals) and uni-
versals. According to Johnson, "the particulars which we can
discover in nature are all which truly pertain to nature. ,,J-
In other words, "creation is a congregation of individual
existences."^ Universals do not exist except in a verbal
sense. Johnson questions: "What is the identity of grass
beyond the sensible resemblance of tho different blades?" And
he answers: "Nothing but the name grass. "3 Prom a semantical
point of view we may say that no universals exist for Johnson
because the universe consists of objects each of which could in
principle have a proper name. Even predicates are names of
particular sights, feels, etc., only: the predicate "red" docs
not name a universal red of which various reds are instances; it
names a particular red (in view of the fact that all names are
general, as Johnson recognizes, the term "red" names many
particular reds) which has no sensible identity with any other
red.
Equipped with the distinctions that we have so far disucussed,
and the criterion that perception, in a broad sense, is the guide
1
""Johnson, A Treatise on Language , op . cit . , p. 75 (Lee. IV,
par. 7).
2
Ibid
., p. 79 (Lee. V, par. 11).
3Ibid.
, p. 61 (Lee. V, par. 9).
29
to existing objects, Johnson is prepared to classify the
contents of the universe. He affirms:
The whole universe can be nominally analyzed
into sights, sounds, tastes, feels, smells, internal
feelings, thoughts, and words **
This classification is somewhat more detailed than the
following which Johnson makes in a different lecture, in
which the universe is said to be "a mass of sights, sounds,
tastes, feels, and smells. "2 Employing distinction (a) 3 we
may say of these classifications that the first refers to the
universe of both verbal and sensible objects, while the second
intends the universe of sensible objects only* The sensible
universe, moreover, consists not only of objects which have a
name, but of all nameable objects. As Johnson recognizes,
there are more things than names of things.
Let us first consider external phenomena, a group of
objects in which Johnson takes most interest. Two criteria
are relevant to the classification of such phenomena:
(1) Tciq information that our external senses reveal to us
is identical with external sensible existences .Lj.
(2) That no sense but seeing can inform me of sights,—
that no sense but hearing can inform me of sounds,
—
that no sense but feeling can inform me of feels,--
etc., --are obvious truths.
5
1
Ibid., p. 161 (Lee. XI, par. 9).
Ibid.
, p. lj.8 (Lee. II, par. 6).
-*Seo page 16 above.
5-
^"This is a paraphrase of the quotation page 19 above.
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. , p. 55 (Lee. Ill, par. 2).
30
The first criterion is essentially the empiricist tenet
that to be is to be perceived, with the following modification
in the light of distinction (c): What exists must be amenable
to perception, not necessarily any single person's perception,
nor that of any presently living and perceiving person. It is
moreover, not because objects are perceivable that they exist;
it is only that if an object exists (in the ontological sense),
then it must be perceivable by some person. Relative to any
given perceiver, however, we may speak of an object as existing
or not existing for that perceiver, in the sense of object-of-
knowledge. An object exists in this sense for some person if
it is a part of his subjective universe. It is Johnson's
business to investigate his own universe, and to help us use
language correctly in regard to ours.
Though the chemist in Johnson's day found forty inconvert-
ible substances in the universe, as a consequence of criterion
(2) "creation is susceptible of a classification more definite,
and even less multifarious." Since each of the senses is
generis as a source of knowledge, and since the information that
we receive from any one sense cannot be given by any other,
there are five distinct, intransmutable and inconvertible types
of sense information: sounds , sights , feel s , smells and tastes .
These insights lead Johnson to the following definitions:
Ibid., p. ij_7 (Lee. II, par. 1;)
.
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Every information received from the sense of seeing,
I call a sight.
Every information received from the sense of feeling,
I call a feel.
Every information received from the sense of hearing,
I call a sound.
Every information received from the sense of tasting,
I call a taste.
Every information received from the sense of smelling,
I call a smell.
1
The discussion of distinction (d) indicated that the
information of our sense consists of objects which are particular.
The following distinction must now be added to the other four:
(e) The external sensible universe consists of asic
particulars and complex particulars *
Particulars may occur singly as, for example, in a shadow
which is only a sight; wind, which is only a feel; thunder or
an echo which are only sounds. They may, and most frequently
do, occur in groups of various combinations as, for example,
in an orange which is a fool, a sight, a smell and a taste.
It may be objected here that what is called basic is really
complex. Thus the sound thunder is really a combination of many
different sounds. In the Treatise the distinction (e) would
therefore have to be interpreted in this way: if a particular is
constituted only of the information of one sense, it is a basic
particular; but if a particular is constituted of information
that is derived from r.ore than one sense, it is a complex
particular. Under this interpretation thunder would constitute
a basic particular, no matter whether it is made up of one
Johnson, v
_
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sound or of several sounds. An orange, on the other hand,
would constitute a complex particular since it is made up of
information from more than one sense. A rainbow under this
interpretation would also be a basic particular. Yet in some
sense a rainbow is complex, consisting of many different sights.
The interpretation is therefore not entirely satisfactory . In
a later work Johnson lists various theorems which clarify his
position somewhat. The following theorem will be sufficient
for our purposes (other theorems are mu t a 1 1 3 nut and is the same
for other sense information)
:
(Tl) Whatever number of things seeing informs me of at the
same time, they constitute but one sight.
Johnson explains this theorem as follows
:
When I look at a tree, the view may be so general
as to include the whole tree, or so particular as to
include the whole tree, or so particular as to include
one of the leaves only, or some filament of a leaf; but
the gaze, whether general or particular, constitutes
what the theorem designates as one sight. ^-
Thus the sight rainbow or the sight tree is a basic
particular in spite of its obvious complexity. Dinstinction (e)
is necessary to understand what Johnson has in mind here, Never-
theless, a sixth distinction (f) is necessary also, to distin-
guish types of complexity:
(f ) The complexity of a basic particular is intra-ser.sual ;
that of a complex particular is inter-sensual.
Ibid
. , p . ij.
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I call a rainbow an "intra-scnsual complexity" because
its complexity is manifested within the range of one sense
alone. An orange, on the other hand, I shall call an "inter-
sensual complexity" because its complexity is manifested within
the range of several senses. The distinction is warranted not
for the sake of clarity alone; it is helpful to distinguish
types of complexity because different types engender different
kinds of linguistic difficulties*
Difficulties, however, exist even apart from language. We
find in the Treatise several principles (some of which are
expressed clearly and explicitly as theorems only in Johnson's
The Physiology of the Senses ) that must be kept in mind when
dealing with particulars; for if these principles are ignored,
errors ensue in both our reasoning and our knowledge-claims
•
I shall now turn to these errors in the light of Johnson's
principles or theorems.
Since the theorems governing phenomena hold mutatis
nut and is of each of the several types of phenomena, I shall
state each theorem only once, and each time in respect to sight.
And since (Tl) has been explained, \^e proceed to (T2) •
(T2) Only seeing can inform me of sights, and ii can inform
me of nothing but sights.
This theorem is a combination of two complementary theorems
in Johnson which are equivalent to it: (i) Seeing can inform me
of nothing but sights. (2) Anything which seeing informs me
3k
of, no one or more of my senses can inform me of. It 3bould
be observed that (T2), which is a stronger statement than
criterion (2), is analytic since it is entailed by the defini-
tion of a sight. The definition tells us that any information
received through seeing is called a "sight," and no information
of any other sense is called a "sight." The next theorem is a
pformalized version of some earlier statements to the effect
that the information of our senses constitutes our entire
sensible knowledge.
(T3) That of which no one or more of my senses can inform me,
is not sensible.
3
This theorem, which is rendered explicit in later writings,
is again analytic for it follows from an implicit definition
that something is sensible if, and only if, it is cognizable by
my senses. Johnson tells us that one portion of the external
universe "is cognizable by our senses. This portion I shall
classify by itself, and call /its member s_7 sensations—sensible
things, and sometimes physical things,"^-
(Tl|) Any sight which seeing has not informed me of, is unknown
to me.
5
1Ibid., p. 23.
2
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The above theorem follows from the definition of sight,
in conjunction with (T2) and ( m3)« It is clear1 that when
Johnson says "unknown to me" he means "sensibly unknown to
me." It is still possible that an object which I have not
seen is known to be, viz., I possess
_
. knowledge of it.
Given this explication of knowledge, (Tij.) , finally, is again
analytic.
Wo find in Johnson the following theorem also:
If anything (A) bo one sight, and anything (B)
another, and A and 3 together another sight (A3,)
seeing does not inform me of the sight A3, when it
informs me o f the sight A and the sight 3.1
This theorem follows from the conjunction of (Tl) and (TI4.) •
(Tl) tells us that a combination of different sights is again
a sight. Eence when I see sight A and sight B, which are
different from sight AB, I will know nothing of sight A3
according to (TI4.) „ Moreover, in the light of (T2) it ia
possible to strengthen the above theorem to read instead:
(T5>) If anything (A) be one sight, and anything (3) another,
and A and 3 together another sight (A3), neither seeing,
nor any other sense , can inform me of the sight AB when
it informs me of zhe sight A and the sight 3.
Note here that (T£) is probably not analytic since it is
partially contigent on (Tl) , which is not analytic given tho
interpretation which Johnson intends, namely, that a combination
of differont sights is itself an entirely r sight. Thus he
Ibid., p . 1.
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writes in the Treatise : "A change of appearance is an.
sight, and irremediably unknown till disclosed by our eyes."
(T'6) When we see a sight, experience alone induces us to
expect that it is associated with a feel.
2
Johnson explains this theorem as follows:
We erroneously deem the sight a proof that a feel
exists, and hence we suspect no possibilit?/ of mistake
when we predicate tangibilit;y of the sun, moon and stars.
We suppose that we can see their tangibility; a supposi-
tion which involves the absurdity that we can feel with
our sight.
3
When I see a table which 1 have never felt, I shall not be
able to predicate tangibility of it because tangibility is a
feel and hence, by (TLj.) as applied to feels, I cannot know that
the table is tangible. The fact that I see the table, moreover,
cannot help me to know that the table is tangible on account of
(T2) . But this is not the entire content of (To). It says
furthermore (a) that a sight in conjunction with the relevant
past experience allows me to expect a feelj and (b) that the
relevant experience in question informs me of a connection
between a sight and a feel. I observed previously that there
exist two varieties of complexity in certain particulars.
Johnson does not take up the question of how we determine the
difference between associated and unassociated particulars, nor
Johnson,
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why some are associated and others are not. It is clear,
however, that some sense experience is relevant to such a
determination. The following theorem, suggested by point (b)
above, will be helpful in what follows:
(T?) A complex particular is unknown to me until apprehended
by a conjunction of the relevant senses.
The theorem is an extention of (Th,.) which says that an
uncompounded particular is unknown to me unless perceived by
the relevant sense. Note also that (To) can now be said to
follow from (T2), (Tl|)
,
(T7) and an inductive principle such
as (a) above.
Let us now consider some problems which arise if these
theorems are not adhered to. Johnson's analysis of complex
particulars has shown that an orange, for example, is consti-
tuted of four non-complex basic particulars. Ordinarily
,
when we see an orange and subsequently feel it, we are inclined
to say that we have perceived the same orange twice. This,
however, is inaccurate: we have experienced the orange itself
only if we have experienced all its aspects according to (T7).
There exists no one sense which reveals to us the object called
"orange." That we have not experienced the same things twice
but only aspects of the same thing when we have felt and seen
an orange is furthermore emphazised by (T2) , for if a sight
were identical with a feel then seeing could reveal to me -
feel and feeling could reveal to mo a sight. Furthermore, by
(T3) it follows that the above four aspects of an orange exhaust
33
its sensible content, and that if an orange is alleged to
have a substance in which these four aspects are "embedded,"
this substance is not sensible. Finally, by (T6) , if we have
never felt an orange we cannot predicate tangibility of it
when xve see it.
But even if we observe (T6) we may still be misled. Johnson
tells us that the aspects of complex particulars are separable.
Thus we may separate the sight gold from the feel gold by
placing a piece of gold before a mirror. The mirror will
exhibit the sight gold without the corresponding feel. All
paintings are essentially sights without the usual associated
feel, and in the absence of light or of eye-sight, all feels
are separated from their usual associated sights.
Another problem which arises in connection with complex
particulars is the ambiguity of a dispute in which the disput-
ants argue about the nature of a thing and each of them alludes
to a different aspect of it. This problem, however, is connected
p
with language and will therefore be treated later.
Finally, there arises an interesting problem in connection
with (T5) . If I have never seen a rainbow, though I have seen
all of its colors, and its dimensions and configuration have
been described to me, by (T5) I cannot claim to sensibly know
the rainbow as a whole. If this is the case then it would
Ibid
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follow that descriptive knowledge is in some sense less
powerful or informative or revealing than sensible knowledge.
Insofar as this problem relates to language and knowledge I
shall discuss it in detail in Chapter II, At this point,
since I am describing the contents of the universe, I wish to
bring up a few counter-examples to (T£) which, I think, are
revealed in nature. One difficulty which besets the present
inquiry is the fact that (T>) is indebted not only to the
empirical (Tl), but also to the analytic (?2) and (TI4.) • I
shall contend in the next chapter that Johnson's depreciation
of descriptive knowledge is partially due to his confusing the
empirical with the analytic content of (T'5) . As a preparation
for this discussion the following considerations are relevant:
There exists, first of all, an interesting connection
between the senses of smell and taste in respect to a number of
substances (e.g., peppermint, onion, certain organic compounds
of the ester family, etc.,) which need to be smelled in order
to be tasted. That is, only if we smell such substances can we
taste them. Now it would seem therefore that a smell may
reveal a taste. Yet according to (T2) this is analytically
false.
Again, there does not appear anything in; principle
incorrect when we say that a sound may be revealed by a sight.
A practised musician will hea: a certain combination of sounds
in his "mind's oar 1" when he sees a certain configuration of
notes. And this is precisely the reason why a musician can
discriminate wrong notes from right ones on the basis of
vision, or more accurately, on the basis of what he hears in
his mind's ear, which is induced by the configuration of notes
that he sees. Conversely, it is possible to speak of sounds
producing sights. Thus when we ] ear a description of any
object, some mental image is usually evoked by that description.
Whether or not this mental image fits the description or not is
immaterial here. The point is that son image is produced, and
hence a word, which is a s ound in a spoken description,
produces a mental image which is a sight .
Finally, we may induce sense-information by means other
than the five senses. Thus when we dream, or when we are under
the influence of certain drugs, we may have a variety of sights,
feels, etc., none of which is due to the slightest effort on
the part of our senses. But again, this assertion is
analytically false in view of (T2) . Hence Johnson disagrees
with these alleged counter-examples as would be expected. He
tells us for example: "That language can reveal to me no sight
that seeing has not informed me of, is a physical truth which
experience will substantiate . " But he is mistaken in thinking
that the theorem in question is a physical truth. The theorem
is analytic since it follows from Johnson's definitions of
2
sense informations, as I indicated. Johnson asserts the same
Ibid
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in respect to all other types of phenomena, and he would
probably rule out any other putative source of sense
Information apart from the five senses themselves.
Now it is indeed false by definition to say tha ntal
image is a sight, and false by (T2) to cay that a mental image
is revealed by some agency othor than seeing. The problem
therefore reduces to the following questions:
(a) Is Johnson's definition of "sense informations'"
acceptable, or is it too narrow?
(b) What precisely is meant by "'is revealed"!?
These questions are not independent of each other. If,
for example, "revealed"' should mean "caused"', then it is clear
that the information revealed to us bj hearing, for instance,
includes not only sounds but sights also, namely mental images,
because a word, which is a sound, can reveal or j ause a mental
image, which is ordinarily some kind of sight.
To amend Johnson's definitions, however, entails a
complete revision of nearly all theorems as well. Thus (T2)
would need to be drastically revised so as to allow sights to
be revealed not only by seeing but by hearing. To effect such
a revision is not my intention. I have suggested questions (a)
and (b) above only to indicate where the difficulties which I
shall discuss in Chapter II originate, and where revision of
Johnson's system would have to commence.
1See Chapter Ii
,
pages 123ff, for further discussion of
these points.
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In order4 for the theorems which I have discussed above to
apply to internal feelings, which are private phenomena, it
becomes necessary to revise a number of them. This revision,
however, is suggested by information given in the Treatise
,
and the revised theorems should be regarded as additional ones
and not as substitutes for the others. That is, Johnson's
complete epistemological theory will include both the original
and the revised theorems.
I have thus far discussed external phenomena: sights, fesls,
sounds, smells and tastes. I shall next consider internal
phenomena: ;h oughts and interne feelings One would suppose
that a distinction between feelings and feels should be made,
but Johnson does not wish to do this. He recognizes that "the
sense of feeling is usually restricted to external information' 5^
but he wishes nevertheless to broaden the usage to include
internal feelings as well. Johnson thereby introduces an
unnecessary ambiguity since, on the one hand, the information
received through consciousness is generically different from
that which is received through external feeling] on the other
hand, he fails to distinguish between feels and feelings. I
shall, for perspicuity, retain a distinction between feels as
external and feelings as internal. Johnson in later writings
provides for this distinction when he makes a change in
pterminology
.
Ibid
. , p. 1^9 (Lee. XI, par. 1).
2
See Chapter III page 136 below.
3To describe internal feelings in detail would be to
repeat a great deal of what has already been said concern!
external phenomena since many of the theorems govern ing tl
apply to internal feelings "even more violently."1 Nevertheless
there are some interesting differences.
The term "revealed" continues to be vague in this context
also. What is meant by "internal feelings are revealed to me"?
If I am speaking of my own feelings then the answer would be:
"Internal feelings are revealed to me" means "my consciousness
is receiving certain types of information." It is clear that
"revealed" here cannot mean "caused" as I suggested above.
Consider the internal feeling called "pain." Pain is not caused
by my consciousness; it is only apprehended by it. Consider
next the pain of a person other than myself. According to (Tlj.)
if my consciousness has not apprehended this person's pain,
the pain is unknown to me. Now it may be maintained that I
could never knoxv another 1 s pain except indirectly by judging
his external behavior, because his pain is a private phenomenon.
But if this is so it would follow by (?3) that another's pain
is not sensible; and by (T6) it would follow that we could
never in principle judge that someone is- in pain by examining
his external behavior alone. And hence external behavior is no
indication of internal feelings at all. But this dees not
accord with Johnson's ideas, for he says that a word such as
""
l.'.'>a.d
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"fear" would not bo destitute of meaning for a person whose
consciousness had never informed him of such a feeling In
himself, because such a
word includes within its signification seme external
action or appearance, which enables us to determine
by looking at a man, that he is sleepy, faint, angry,
jealous, envious, hungry, etc .3-
If we are able to determine this by .ooki ig then either
(T6) holds and it is possible for my consciousness to apprehend
another person's internal feelings, or else (To) must be revised.
It is not clear which of these alternatives Johnson would favor,
since he is not interested in this particular question as I
2indicated earlier, nor does he seem to be aware that there is
any real difficulty*
Let us pursue this problem somewhat further since other
theorems are involved here as well. We may wonder, for example,
what Johnson means by "to determine" in the above quotation. If
"to determine" is synonymous with "to reveal" then (?2) would
need revision since it tells us that only consciousness can
reveal feelings. But the two phrases are not synonymous as the
following quotation indicates
:
By means of these external exhibitions, a man who
should be void of internal feelings, might discourse
about love, anger, envy, etc.; as a man who should be
void of the sense of taste, could talk of the delieious-
ness of peaches, oranges, grapes, etc.,—his words
referring to the appearance of the fruits.
3
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2See page 20 above.
3Loc. cit.
My consciousness therefore has not apprehended anotta
person's feelings when my sight "determines" these feeling3
Hence (T2) need not be revised. Furthermore, since Johnson
would thus be forced to embrace the second alternative above,
(To) would have to be revised in respect to internal feelings.
Moreover, (T3) must be altered since surely another person's
internal feelings are sensible even thou ; consciousness
could never apprehend them. The alteration of (T3) is not
difficult. We noted earlier that (T3) is contingent upon the
definition that something is sensible if, and only if, it is
cognizable by my senses. The following definition, which is in
accord with my earlier discussion of subjective and objective
universes, yields the desired theorem: Something is sensible
if, and only if, it is cognizable by some person ' s senses . Thus
our theorem may be rendered as follows:
(T3a) That of which no one or more of
_
ny_ person ' s senses can
inform him, is not sensible,,^-
Notice, however, that (TI4.) , which was said to follow from
(T2) and (T3) no longer follows when we replace (T3) by (T3a)
•
Instead a much weaker version is entailed:
(Tij.a) Any sight which seeing has not informed someone of, is
unknown to me .
1
Since (T?) was said to be an extension of (TI4.) , the
replacing of (Ti|) by (Tl+a) results in (T7a):
Compare page 3^- above.
(T?a) A complex particular is unknown to me until apprehended
by a conjunction of the relevant senses of some pers n.
Notice further that when (Ti+a) replaces (Tij.), a new
interpretation of the term "unknown" must be made, for it can
no longer mean only "sensibly unknown." The term must now
mean "verbally unknown" unless the person happens to be myself.
The following analysis of the meaning of (T7a) makes this
difference clear: A complex particular is sensibly unknown to
me until apprehended by a conjunction of the relevant senses;
and it is verbally unknown to me until apprehended by a conjunc-
tion of some person's senses. That is, unless some person has
perceived the complex particular with all his relevant senses,
he cannot inform me about it, and I cannot therefore have verbal
knowledge of it. This analysis accords with one interpretation
of verbal meaning that I shall give later*
The newly derived theorems are therefore consistent with
the original ones as long as we interpret the term "unknown"
appropriately for each set. I\Tote also that the revision affects
(T5) in a similar manner. Finally, I shall not attempt to
revise (T6) here since (T6) was said to follow from several
theorems including some inductive principle. But I want to
avoid raising problems concerning inductive analogy, especially
since the principle in question has not been stated clearly
and since Johnson gives no indication what this principle ought
See pages 72ff below.
to be, or under what conditions inductive analogy applies.
I turn now to a discussion of" thoughts. The nature of
thoughts is somewhat more difficult to determine since they
seem to be a border-line case: they are not quite like external
phenomena though they are definitely connected with the latter.
And though they would deserve to be classified among internal
phenomena, they are unlike most internal feelings. We rarely
speak of what thoughts re, but taking this somehow for granted
we speak rather of what they are t, Distinguishing thoughts
from perceptions, to say for example that perceptions are the
"material" of our knowledge and thoughts are about them, as in
the distinction between impressions and ideas, has been found
useful in explaining the nature of memory and the recollection,
sustenance, combining and ordering of impressions, or perceptions,
even in the absence of alleged causal factors. Thus Locke speaks
of "ideas" some of which are perceptions, and others which are
about them* or about combinations of them, whether actually
perceived in such combinations or not. This distinction Is
useful in the investigation of the nature of knowledge. Thus
if knowledge is said to be a collection of ideas in various
combinations, etc., then knowledge not only _is perception, as
Johnson maintains, but it is also about perceptions, as he
fails to emphazise.
For Johnson there cannot be thoughts . :bout perceptions, in
above sense, for this would make thoughts different from what
they are about. But a thought about a word
_
_
a word, A
thought about a sight, feel, smell, etc., _is that sight, feel,
smell, etc. He suggests, for example:
Think the word million. The thought is a word.
When we pronounce million audibly, it is a word; when
we pronounce it inaudibly, it is a thought.
^
Johnson finds much connection between our organs of
speech and the production of verbal thoughts, so much in fact
that he concludes: "my verbal thoughts are as evidently the
production of my organs of speech, and located in my mouth, as
words are.'
He restricts other types of thought in the same manner a
After distinguishing five classes of thoughts, each correspond-
ing to one of the five senses , he tells us: "Each class conforms
to the peculiarities of the sense with whose phenomena it is
connatural. "3 Thus in the case of vision and visual thoughts,
for example
:
Visual thoughts possess the evanescence of vision.
They flash and vanish. They possess also the comprehen-
siveness of vision. We comprehend in one gaze the whole
starry firmament, and our thought of the firmament is as
capacious as the gaze, and apparently as remote from our
contact M
The conception of thoughts which Johnson thus entertains
is rather curious. Prom what he says it follows that some of
Ibid., p. 92 (Lee. V 3 par. ij.0) «
2
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. , p. 93 (Lee. V, par* q.2)
.
Ibid., p. 9k (Lee. V, par. 1+5) .
^Tbiri
., p. 93 (Lee, V, par. i|4) •
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our thoughts ara red, others green, some hot and others acridl
I suppose there is some analogy between what Johnson believes
thoughts to be and what goes on in our minds • We certainly
have flashes of images, we hear sounds in our "mind's ear" and
so forth. Eut the more interesting mental events are those
which are said to be about such images and sounds, etc. Thus
when we evaluate a painting, when we rank and grade it among
others, when we calculate what it will bring in an auction,
what goes on in our mind are not flashes of sights, but thoughts
about the painting and a host of related things.
Words, Language and the Problem of Generality
Words are identical with what was earlier called "verbal
entities," which differ from sensible entities not because
words are non-sensible, but because they serve a unique purpose.
Words, in whatever sensible form they may occur, are the signs
of sensible objects. These objects may be either external
phenomena, internal feelings or words themselves. Two
distinctions in respect to verbal entities are necessary:
(1) Expressions that have a referent are distinguished from
expressions without a referent. The former are - -eras
,
the latter simply express: ons
.
(2) General names are distinguished from • rorer names.
(1) A symbol-string is a word if, and only if, it has a
referent. A symbol-string is an expression if, and only if, it
has no referent. Hence no words are expressions, and no
expressions are words. To determine whether a given symbol
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string is a word it is necessary to determine whether it has
a referent. Since words can be the objects of reference we
may determine whether a given symbol-string is a word by
ascertaining whether or not it is listed in a dictionary.
may determine this also by ascertaining whether or not someone
uses this symbol-string to refer either to an external phenome-
non or to an internal feeling.
An expression becomes a word when it is made the sign of
some referent. When an expression has become a word it is no
longer an expression. Since for Johnson to name or to refer
to is to mean, and since the terms "object named," "referent,"
and "meaning" are synonymous, it follows from the definitions
that no word is meaningless, and that all expressions are
meaningless. The notion of a word is here a semantical one,
not a syntactical one. Any symbol-string might be a word or
may become a word. But we cannot tell by looking at a symbol
-
string whether it is a word or an expression unless we already
know it to be associated with a referent. We shall find that
for Johnson, every word has some referent and that therefore
every word is meaningful, flence when Johnson speaks of
meaningless words he employs the term "meaningless" in a
special sense. The term "meaningless"' obviously does not mean
"devoid of reference."
Words could be defined as a sub-class of expressions but I
wish to avoid the ambiguity in the term "expression" when the
intersection of the class of words and the class of expressions
is not empty.
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(2) A word is a general name if, and only if, it refers
to more than one object. A word is a proper name if, and only
if, it refers uniquely to some object.
Johnson tells us:
The English language contains but a few thouss rds,
while objects to which we apply the words are innumerable.
m
o effect these infinite appliances, every word receives
many meanings. Snow is white, paper is white, silver is
white, you are white, and the floor is white;!
And therefore "language is a collection of general terms,
but creation is a congregation of individual existences . " But
though there are more objects in the universe than words, it
is not the case that there exists an object which has no name.
Consider the word "particular". Everything in the universe is
named by this word since everything, according to Johnson, is
particular. What is true, however, is that very few particulars
have a proper name. The word "Eiffel Tower," is ;at this point
a proper name for there exists a unique object to which it
refers. But its status as a proper name is easily upset: I
shall now call my typewriter an "eiffel tower," and from now
on the word "eiffel tower" is a general name.
Johnson does not employ the term "proper name." He uses
the terms "name" and "general name," and there are occasional
ambiguities in his statements. Be says, for example,
•'Johnson,
_
, Tres tise , c__. cit . , p, 26 (Lee. Ill*
par. I4.) .
Ibid., p. 79 (Lee. V, par. 2).
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Tastes, smells, sounds, and feels, are seldom
designated specifically by names. Men have been more
sparing of names to tastes, smells, sounds, and feels,
than even to sights* Fragrant, fetid, and a few other
words, are all that we have deigned appropriate to the
information of the sense of smelling. 1
Again
:
But not only numerous sights, sounds, tastes, feels,
and smells, possess separately no name; many associations
possess no name. We name such associations only as
utility requires us to designate. A certain associated
sight and feel we disignate by the word square...^
Finally, when discussing different occurences of white
he tells us: "A perfect language should have a separate word
for each of these appearances, and a separate word for every
other phenomenon. :T3 Nov; when Johnson says "designated
specifically by names," in the first quotation, he does net
mean "proper names" for he goes on to enumerate a few of the
names that we do have, and these are clearly general names.
The same usage is involved in the second quote. But it is
farther gv£d§ii1i th&t fe§ i§ fcl %§ki\ ••-•- fciPtU uQe\
name" in a special sense, for it is not the case that some
"associations possess no name" as 1 observed in the case of
the word "particular." Thus we must either make a second
distinction between types of general names, or else not take
Johnson's statements literally. The association of a certain
Ibid
. , p. 5>G (Lee. II, par* 13) •
Ibid
. , p. 5C (Lee. II, par. II4.) .
•*Ibid .
, p. 113 (Lee. VII, introduction).
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sight and feel is called "square." There are numerous
geometric configurations which do not have a rr.ore lef - ;
name than simply "geometric configuration" or, "particular,"
though they have some name. Thus I shall not add a furth
distinction, but interpret Johnson's statements in the above
manner.
Consider now the third quotation above. Johnson is
clearly speaking of proper names. According to Johnson
there exist no two particulars which are identical such that
if we were to name one of them the other would automatically
have the same name. He observes that "No two existences are
as identical in nature as in name . "* Hence if every particular
in the universe would be named by a different word, cur language
p
would consist solely of proper names. Such a language would
be ideal; but such is not ordinary language. The names in
ordinary language, however, are the subject we wish to pursue
further. Johnson tells us that the names of ordinary
language
are at present so identified and confounded with
external existences, that we cannot discover the sub-
ordination which language b&arL to the realities of
nature, but are continually ... imputing to nature limit-
ations, classifications, am ities, imperfections,
and properties, of various kinds, which truly belong to
language alone.
3
1Ibid
. , p. 8? (Lee. V, par. 22).
pFor further re. s on the possibility of an ideal language
see Chapter II page 90 below.
3lbld., p. £3 (Lee. II, par. 21).
We wonder what It is in the power of language to effect,
and we find that Johnson allows language one function only,
namely the referential function. Thus he claims: "Our senses
alone can answer questions. Words can only refer us to what
our senses reveal. nl And in his conclusion Johnson lists as a
major result: "I have shown that language can effect no more
than to refer us to phenomena." 1- Notice therefore that the
relation of reference is a triple relation: A word refers some
person to some object * With this emphasis on pragmatics it is
necessary to interpret the notion of reference as consisting of
more than what is called "designation" or "denotation" in
modern semantics. It means that and much more: it means also
that some person is being referred to, guided or led by a word
to an object. A word directs a person's attention to its
referent; it gives him some guidance helpful in ascertaining
that referent But it cannot do more than this. It cannot,
for example, reveal its referent (unless its referent is a
word) for by (T2) only our senses can do this.
Unfortunately language even in its positive capacity is
prone to mislead us, first by pretending that there exist
objects which in fact do not exist, secondly by obscuring the
intricacies of complex objects. Language is therefore more
an evil than a blessing, and an investigation of language must
Ibid., p. 2l\h (Lee* XIX, par. I4.)
.
Ibid
. 3 p. 301 (Conclusion),
be concerned in the first place with its defects. These
defects are irremediable: but they must nevertheless bo
pointed out:
The most I hope to perform is to make them known;
as we erect a beacon, to denote the presence of a shoal
which we cannot remove.
1
Johnson finds that nearly all problems of inexact reference
or false implication are due to the generality Of language. So
long as we are alert to the difference between a universe of
particulars about which we desire information,, and a language
consisting mostly of general names which we employ in our
quest, and so long as we do not attempt to "make language the
expositor of nature, instead of making nature the expositor of
language,' we shall not be frustrated and misled. But if we
"reverse the order of nature "3 and let the features of language
mislead us into believing that nature shares its structure, its
generality, its universals, its implied identities, etc., then
"we are in danger of wasting time in verbal inquiries . r4
Let us therefore take a closer look at some of the
difficulties which are entailed by the generality of Ian ;uage*
We may distinguish four major problems of which the second and
third are related: (a) Language implies the unity of complex
i- ..Ibid
.
.
p. 33 (Lee. 1, par. 9).
2Ibid
.
,
p. 59 (Lee. Ill, par. 8).
3lbid., p. 297 (Lee. XXIX, par. 12).
^Ibid., p. 30 (Lee. I, par. 3).
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particulars and obscures their complexity . (b) Language
implies the existence of universals; it takes account of
certain generalities but disregards less obvious individual-
ities, (c) Language implies identities between particulars;
but no such identities exist except in language itself.
(d) Language implies the existence of theoretical agents; but
such agents are a contrivance of language only*.
(a) "Language implies a oneness to which natures conforms
not in all cases,"1 and therefore "the oneness of natural
existences must not be interpreted by their names, but by our
senses. "^ \.jQ have noted earlier the difference between basic
and complex particulars, and between intra-sensual and inter-
sensual complexity. Now any particular, no matter whether it
is intra-sensual or inter-sensual, is in some sense one thing,
or in Johnson's terminology, a "unit." But the sense in which
any particular is said to be a unit varies with the nature of
that particular. A non-complex basic particular such as a
given shacte of red is more obviously one thing than the
inter-sensual complexity called "orange." When we refer to
nature for the unit orange we find four non-complex basic
particulars: the sight orange, the smell orange, the feel
orange and the taste orange. But we find also that these four
particulars are associated in what Bishop Berkeley fittingly
lb i
d
. , p. 55 (Lee. Ill, heading}
Ibid. a p. 55 (Lee. Ill, par, 2).
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called a "bundle" of phenomena. This bundle is appro riately
regarded as a unit. Johnson doe 3 not deny that complex
particulars are units in some sense. In speaking of the
complex particular gold, for instance, he says: ,fYou may a
whether I mean to assert that gold is not a unit? It is a
unit, but its oneness must be interpreted by what our senses
reveal. "^
A rainbow, which is a basic particular of intra-sensual
complexity, is more obviously a unit such as a shadow or a
shade of red, than an orange. When we look at a rainbow we
perceive the oneness "at a glance ir as it were; but looking at
an orange, unless we are not familiar with Johnson's analysis
of complex particulars, we shall see only the sight orange.
Of course we perceive the sight orange as a unit, but we only
see the sight orange when regarded as a part of the complex
orange. Thus there is more difficulty in perceiving the unit
orange than there is in perceiving the unit rainbow, and it is
this experimental fact which lends cogency to (Tl), a theorem
telling us that a combination of two sights is a third sight,
and that this third sight is one, sight.
The curious manner in which I have spoken here of seei.
an orange, perceiving an orange, seeing an orange sight, etc.,
suggests that Johnson, on the basis of his analysis of types of
particulars, might be interested in a revision of ordinary
language. Let us speculate about what such a revision mi
ibid
., p. 56 (Lee. Ill, par. 3).
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involve-,.. Consider the following list of statements:
(1
(2
(3
(k
(5
(6
(7
(3
(9
Person A perceives an orange.
A sees an orange,
A perceives gold.
A sees an orange *
A perceives an orange .
A tastes gold.
A perceives music*
A sees an orange^.
There exists an orange.
Let the term "oransre " mean "feel orange," and let theo^ i
term "orange " mean "sight orange." Similar subscripts shall
be employed for other types of phenomena as necessary.
Note that in ordinary language both (l) and (2) imply (9).
For Johnson, however, the implication between (1) and (9) might
or might not hold, while the implication between (2) and (9)
can never hold, because the term "orange" and the term "perceive"
are ambiguous, on the basis of his analysis of perception and
complex particulars. "Orange" might mean "orange " or "orange-^,"
etc,; and "perceive" might mean "see," "feel," etc., or ail of
these, or any combination of them. Let us first consider a
revision such that (1) validly implies (9).
(i) We shall define the term "perceive" to mean "feel,
smell, see, and taste," but we shall retain the ordinary mean-
ing of orange, that is, we shall not split its meaning into
five different terms. It is clear that in this system (1)
59
implies (9). But within this system it is impossible to
assort (7)* and moreover, (3) implies the absurdity (6). To
remedy these defects it would be necessary to re-define the
term "perceive" for each different complex particular, a task
too cumbersome to provide the utility which is sought.
(ii) We shall instead split up the meaning of rhe tc.
"perceive" so that five different terms for each type of
perception are available « The ordinary meaning of orange is
again retained. Statement (9) cannot follow from statement (1)
in this system since (1) is not available. We can assert (2),
but it is clear that (2) in this system engenders the same
difficulties that we first encountered with (1). (2) in orcir..
language implies (9). But not only can this implication never
hold, the statement (2) is nonsensical. (2) implies the absurd
statement (8) in this system since the terra "orange" includes
"orange^", "orangep 15', etc. We must therefore either amend the
ordinary notion of "seeing" such that (9) doss not follow from
(2), or else split up the meaning of "orange."
(iii) Let us modify (ii) so that the ordinary notion of
"see" is retained, but the meaning of "orange" is split, ng
available five different terms in place of one. In this system
statements such as (2) will become statements such as (!+) • It
is clear that (i^) does not entail (9)* if only because (9) -
not available. That is, we now no longer have a name for ^he
orange as a complex particular v but only names for its parts.
To assert that sue;, a complex exists would require that the
60
conjunction of five statements such as (I4.) be true,
conjunction would in turn entail a conjunction of five
statements, namely, "Orange^ exists; orange^, exists; etc"
Since no nonsensical statements are implied by any of the
statements allowed in this system, the system is sufficient
and precise. Unfortunately it is somewhat cumbersome.
Two other alternatives, equally precise but less cumber-
some than (iii) are as follows:
(iv) The following modification of (ii) is preferable:
We retain the ordinary meaning of '"orange" and we adjust the
meaning of "see" such that (9) cannot follow from (2).
(v) Let us keep the ordinary meaning of "perceive," but
let us split up the meaning of "orange." In this system
statements such as (5) become statements such as (Ij.) , that is,
the meaning of "perceive" is automatically split by the choice
of orange-word. Moreover, "perceive" can mean only one type of
perception at a time. Finally, the ordinary notion of "see'r
need not be altered since statements such as (2) must also
become statements such as (ij.); and (ij.) cannot imply falsely
statement (9)
•
This last system seems by far the most preferable, and
there are indications in Johnson's later writings that he would
favor a system in which the term "orange" is split. Thus, in
The Meaning of Words he suggests a system of word indexing.
"Johnson, The Meaning; j .-l ords , etc., op_ . c i t . , pp. 89-91*
f -
*^_
Inattention to the nature of complex particulars has
caused errors in philosophical speculation. Johnson rei^ ;es
:
Bishop Berkeley perceived that the word re
signifies a sight and a feel. He knew I : ;hat the
lality of nature controls the oneness of the name*
supposed that the oneness of the name proves the u.
of nature to be fallacious; and that eith ight :
the true roundness, or the feel. Ke decided in favour of
the feel, and hence he proclaimed roundness to be invisible:
invisible because he restricted the name to the feel'.l
Word indexing might have helped in this situation. Had
Berkeley said that roundness consists of roundness^ and
roundness,,, and had he kept the difference in mind, he would
have recognized that roundness is alone invisible,, but that
roundness is not invisible since it includes roundness^*
Similarly when Hume argues that since the table which we
see diminishes as we recede from it, and since the real table
does not, and that therefore we fail to see the real table, he
would have realized his error had he employed word indexii
Then he would have said: "The table diminishes as we recede;
but the table™ suffers no diminution. If we say that the table.™
is the real table, then indeed we cannot see it. But there is
no reason to restrict the real table to the table-.-,, and hence
it is perfectly proper to say that we see the real table. te:
But not only Berkeley and Hume confused language with
nature: "Estimating nature by the oneness of language is a
'Johnson,
_
•-.--
. -e, p_. c i t . , p. 5? (Lee. Ill,
par. 5)
.
Johnson, ?ho_ ]_ : - of Words , etc . , loc . cit . (a paraphr-
62
fallacy which enters deeply into every system of philosophy,"^
Johnson cites many examples especially from the works of the
empiricists Locke, Berkeley and Hume, but also from some less
well-known authorities: Blair, Saint-Pierre, Reid and Stewart.
To correct the mistakes of their "enigmatic speculations"
however, is not Johnson's main purpose: he discusses them "not
to subvert them, but to elucidate the error on which they are
founded."2
(b) The previous difficulty with language was said to be
that it implied a oneness, or unity, in complex particulars
which is analogous to the unity of basic particulars,, A
special case of this problem was seen to be connected with the
information that we expect our senses to reveal when we are
confronted by alleged units. If the unit is a complex particu-
lar whose constituents are revealed to us by different senses,
as in an orange, then if we are misled by language we will
erroneously believe that any sense alone reveals that unit to
us. But each of the senses can reveal only its proper objects,
and no sense by itself will indicate the unity of a complex
particular.
The next problem concerns units which are nowhere to be
found in nature, but which are a contrivance of language alone.
We discover similarities among certain groups of things, and
""Johnson,
.
• 3 a t i s e 0:1 Lan?u^3 , o. cit ., p. 72 (Lee. Ill,
par. 12).
2 rLoc
.
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,
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ignoring the less obvious diversities among all things, or
abstracting the generalities, we cell groups of things by the
same name. We continue abstracting and broadening our
classifications. The taxonomy of the biological sciences is
a good example. A certain small class of objects called
"blackfish" are classified with other objects on the basis
of increasing generality first in t he species "onitis," then
in the genus "tautoga," the family "labridae," the class
"pisces," the order "amphibians," until finally as "animals"
they are included among insects, horses and men I In
classifying men "enough similarities are discoverable to make
the word appropriate to all." The word "man" therefore,
refers to a mass of dissimilar individuals. Every
word is equally general in its signification. ..sans
of their generality, a few thousand words comprehend all
created existences. Nature is a congregation of individual
existences, and language a collection of general terms. L
The generality of words in such situations has led many
to believe that there exists a unit of a specific sort, often
called a "universal," which is the archetype of the objects
which share one name. Plato thought that a whole world of
such archetypes, or "forms" as he called them, exists, of
which all created objects are only imperfect instances.
Others have thought that there exist qualities and relations
which are units that various classifications of objects are
said to have in common. All white things are so called
because they have the unit "whiteness" in common; all true
3-Ibid.
, p. 79 (Lee. V, par. 2)
propositions share the unit "truth. : ' But
the oneness of a thousand whites is verbal , arid the
oneness of a thousand truths is verbal. The unit is a
creation of language; hence the fallacy, ambiguity, and
difficulty, when we seek in nature for a corresponding
unit .
(c) "Language implies identities to which nature conforms
not . "^ "Language implies always a perfect identity; nature
exhibits, in some cases, a greater approximation to identity
than in other cases." Johnson explains:
For instance:—in two flakes of snow, the snow
presents an identity which is almost complete; but in
a whale and an anchovy- the fish of both animals presents
a very incomplete identity. The fish of the whale and
anchovy is, however, as identical verbally, as the snow
of the two flakes.
3
Johnson's usage of the terms "imply" and "identity" are
very odd. I think we intuit his meaning sufficiently, but it
is very difficult to make it precise. First of all, I do not
think that Johnson means to speak of logical identity since
his "identity" admits of degrees. Even when he says "perfect
identity" I do not think that logical identit?/ is intended.
Let us substitute the term "similarity" for the term "identity"
in Johnson's writings. Now we can speak of degrees of
similarity, and it is clear that the degree of similarity
decreases with each of the following pairs of objects: "snow"
Ibid
. , p. 73 (Lee. IV, par. 3)
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2Ibid., p. 79 (Lee. V, heading;.
3 Ibid
., p. 81 (Lee. V, par. 7).
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. "snow"; snow and snow; whale and anchovy. ;ht
evon construct a "calculus of sj lilarity" by first . 3
numerical values to given degrees of similarity, pe 'haps on a
purely intuitive basis, and then by determining a set of infer-
ence rules governing statements which contain similarity
1
expressions. If we let the connective ! = " represent the
highest degree of similarity, then the following is a theor: .
in Johnson's similarity calculus: "It is not the case that for
any object x, there exists an object y, such the x = y."
The following argument leads to t he error which Johnson is
solicitous to avoid:
1. "fishi" i "fish2
"
2. "fish-^" names whales
3. "fishp" names anchovies
I4.. Objects exhibit similarity of degree 2 if they
are named by words exhibiting similarity of
degree 2
p
5. Therefore: whales = anchovies
But, says Johnson, degree 2 is far too high a degree of
similarity for that which as a matter of fact obtains between
whales and anchovies. Hence the argument is invalid. Premise
If. is not true of whales and anchovies, though it might be tr
of two snow flakes. Just because there is occasionally a
correspondence between the degree of similarity of 3
the degree of similarity of the objects named by them, does 1
mean that this is always the cj.se. It is our tendency,
nevertheless, to regard premise I; as invi ly true. And thus
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when Johnson says that "language implies... " it is an
elliptical way of saying that "the conjunction of premises
one through four implies..."
It may be [thought that the argument above is so obviously
mistaken that it is not conceivable that anyone would commit
the fallacy. Johnson, however, adduces many examples of such
fallacies from ordinary discourse as well as from philosophical
speculations. Thus when physicians find that their remedies
do not work in a given case, though they have never failed
previously, they c harge nature with an anomaly.
The anomaly is, however , in language, which unites
under one name^ as identities, what is only partially
identical. Individuality is no anomaly of nature. It
is nature's regular production, and boundless richness. L
We may now understand the metaphysical puzzle of
Hume, that there is no visible union between any cause
and its effect. The union to which he referred is the
sight and feel exhibited by the links of a chain. But
such a union can never be intended by any person who
asserts that a cause and its effect are united.
-
For one thing, if the link between cause and effect were
like the links of a chain, it would be necessary for cause and
effect to occur simultaneously. The problem however is to be
found in the high degree of similarity between the link of a
chain and the link of cause and effect which the term "link"
implies
.
3-Ibid
. , p. 80 (Lee* V, par. £) .
Ibid., p. 81| (Lee, V, par, 13 ) .
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I earlier suggested that there is a connectic
problems (b) and (c), and bhis should nov: be evident. To
mistaken in point (b) requires that we must first _-.. it
fallacy (c). That is, in order to suppose that universals
exist, or that common properties exist, we must first be
misled by language into supposing that there always sxist
high degrees of similarity between things or between parts of
things
.
(d) A different version of fallacy (b) is to „^Ss. in
nature not for universals or identities, but for a different
sort of unit which we suppose must exist, but which our senses
fail to detect. To assert this constitutes in itself what
Johnson calls a "sensible contradiction":
- are vigilant in detecting verbal contradictions,
but we never detect the sensible contradiction which
exists in affirming the presence of sensible existences,
where none are discoverable
.
1
When we are misled by language, however, we ignore the
truth that we can discourse meaningfully only of what our
senses disclose, and we invent theories to augment the sensible
deficiency. We postulate what Johnson Germs "theoretical
agents , "^ and explain the processes of nature by subtle powers:
—for instance, the unit magnetism is alleged to
be some subtile and invisible emanation or fluid;--the
unit temperature i3 another radiating and insensible
fluid; --gravity another. The unit vitality is
irritability of fibre, and the unit sound is a vibration
. , p. III4- (Lee, VII, par. 2;.
2Ibid., p. 226 (Lee. XVII, par. 10),
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of the atmosphere. The unit is an
undiscoverable essence; sometimes an agitation of
the brain; sometimes an insensible repulsion of
insensible parts; sometimes an internal combustion;
and sometimes an external explosion,-*-
That such theoretical agents are insensible follows from
(T3), and hence to assert that they are sensible is not a
"sensible contradiction," as Johnson supposes, but a verbal
one.
But what is gravity? According to Johnson it is no c.
entity, power or force which has a real existence in nature;
it is the collection of all the processes and events which we
adduce as examples of gravitational activity. Just because we
apply the same word to each of these is not a sufficient ground
to claim that there exists the unit gravity. Thus the word
"gravity" refers after all to certain sens ib] events, etc.,
and hence it can be employed meaningfully. It is meaningless
only if we mistake the type of object to which it refers. The
topics of meaning and meaningfulness' must now be discussed in
greater detail.
Verbal Meaning, Sensible Meaning and the Relation
of Reference
I would like first to characterize and explain the relation
of reference. We have found that reference is usually a one-
many relation obtaining between words and objects, i.e., between
Ibid., p. ?8 (Lee. IV, par. 17).
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signs and significations, referents or meanings. Words are
nearly always general in that each refers to many objects.
Occasionally the relation of reference is a one-one relation.
Some words arc proper names which refer to one unique object.
In what Johnson considers a "perfect language," ail words are
proper names, and hence in such a 1 3 the referential
relation would be exclusively a one-one relation.
It was observed, furthermore, that referent is for
Johnson identical with meaning, and therefore what a word
refers to is simultaneously what that word means. As Johnson
says, "the sensible signification of a sentence is the sensible
existence to which "che sentence refers." Sentences are complex
names which refer to and hence mean states of affairs. Simple
names, or words, function in the same manner.
I indicated also that reference exhausts the capabilities
of words, that is, a word can only refer us to its referent, it
cannot reveal it to us in any significant sense, unless the
referent happens to be another word or phrase. Only our senses,
however, can reveal sensible referents. Only our senses may
continue to "question" significantly the nature of referents
after words have led us to them, and only the information
our senses disclose can be properly said to be abcul referents.
To ascertain the nature of an object, an examination of words
is therefore fruitless* A cuo.'jion of a:, for i Fhat is x,"
'Ibid., p. 168 (Lcc. XII, par. !{.) .
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where x Is any phenomenon whatever , is not a real question at
all but a request to be referred: "X is the name of a phenome-
non which I wish to examine, and I would like to be directed
to it."
Now it may be thought that it makes sense to question
the nature of a complex particular, because some answer not
given by our senses would seem relevant. Thus, for example,
we said earlier that a complex particular is a particular
constituted by the information of more than one sense. Now
this statement is indeed an answer to the question "What is
a complex particular?" But it is a verbal answer, not a
sensible one. The sensible "answer" can be revealed only by
our senses. Similarly, the referent of "referent," or the
meaning of "meaning" cannot be discussed if we are interested
in determining its nature. We may make distinctions, that is,
we may analyse the name "meaning" and thereby indicate that
meaning is complex, and that if we are to investigate it we
must expect to find various phenomena corresponding to the
names which we distinguish. But even in this procedure there
is a danger: we may be interpreting nature by language and
not language by nature. If our analysis of "meaning" indicates
that meaning is complex then we may use this analysis as a
guide to nature. But if we should find no such complexity in
nature as our analysis implies then we would commit the above
fallacy if we were to continue our search for complexity, or
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perhaps postulate non-sensible entities which exist
referents of our analysis.
I observe further that the word "refer" means much more
than the modern term "designate." It is of great importance
in Johnson's system to stress the personal element: a word
refers
i
song to its referent; and a word has a r >nt only
F 01" g : '"-
-
-aus thw relation of reference is not a truly
diadic relation at all. It is a triadic one involving names
,
... meable objects and persons. The relation holds between a
sign and its signification as imposed arbitrarily by some
person. It is imposed whenever those desirous of communication
feel it necessary to employ signs. After a sign has been
correlated with some referent by some person, a constant
conjunction is established between them through usage. A
person acquainted with both the sign and its referent as well
as their concomittance (for which he is responsible, or about
which he learns through experience) will know when he sees
(or hears) the sign what other object is connected with it
5
and he will therefore understand a communication or will be
able to make a communication.
Finally, I indicated that a distinction is to be made
between sensible and verbal meaning. In an attempt to cons era-:.:
an adequate definition of bhese concepts it is imp. ive to
include the personal element since for Johnson the relation of
reference is a triadic one, and since objects of reference are
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identical with meanings. The following definitions capture
the essential meaning of these notion.,.
(a) A word has sensible meaning for any person if, and only
if, it refers to a sensible referent in that person's
subjective universe.
(b) A word has verbal meaning for any person if, and only
if, it refers either (l) to a verbal entity which that
person understands, or (2) to a sensible entity not in
that person's subjective universe, or (3) to alleged
non-sensible entities,,
Recalling the distinction between words and expressions
made earlier, we may say that all words have either sensible
meaning or verbal meaning, and the qualification "entity which
that person understands" in definition (b) insures that verbal
meaning is not equated with meaninglessness . Johnson does not
make this qualification explicitly; but without it the phrase
"reference to words" is vague and can lead to various confusions
as I shall show presently. Notice further that the definitions
allow for the possibility that a word may have both verbal and
sensible meaning. A word may refer both to a sensible entity
in the subjective universe of some person and to a verbal
entity such as the string of words which constitutes its
definition* Indeed, this is precisely what Johnson wishes to
maintain for he tells us that "Nearly every word possesses a
verbal meaning as well as a sensible meaning. "^ The emphasis
on subjective universes makes it possible that the same word
have different meanings for different persons, and that the
—1
xJohnson, Treatise
, p. U4.9 (Lee. X, par. 11).
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ining of a word is dynamic : it may grow ~~ any given
person's sensible knowledge incr Thus Johnson observes
that "A word which at one time signifies a word, may, at
another time, signify a sight, ctc."1
The following illustration will mak : points clear,
A child before it has acquired a language cannot know verbal
meanings though it may know sensible meanings. We cannot of
course say that it knows words which have sensible meaning
since it knows no words. It knows sensible meanings in sofar
as it knows sensible objects which could in principle bee
the sensible meanings of words. The same cannot be said for
verbal meanings since verbal entities are not available to the
child; and since sensible objects in another person's subjective
universe, as well as non-sensible "entities" are accessible to
a given person only through the medium of words {if they arc-
to be apprehended as verbal meanings only) the child shall of
course not know verbal meanings in the last two se: >s either.
Now suppose that the child learns the word "orange" and
finds that it is connected to a certain reddish-yellow ball,
that is, whenever this ball is present it is appropriate to
utter the word. The child has never felt, tasted or smelled
the orange, and therefore the x^ord has no more and no less
meaning for it than what is exhibited to the child when it
looks at the orange. The child's mother, on the other hand,
It,Ibid., p. I6I4. (Lee. XI, par 15).
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has experienced all aspects of this complex particular, and.
hence for the mother the word "orange" has much more sensible
meaning. For her it means the sight, feel, smell and taste of
the orange. The child's father who is unfortunately blind, is
not favored with as much sensible meaning since though he has
experienced at least the taste, smell and Tool of the orange,
he is of course incapable of ascertaining the sight. To tell
him that the orange looks reddish-yellow is to give him verbal
knowledge only. Were he to regain his sight, this verbal
knowledge might well be converted into sensible knowledge.
The child meanwhile has come to know a few more words and
is now capable of knowing verbal meanings. It has learned, for
instance, that an apple's taste which it has experienced, may
be called "sweet." It has not yet learned the taste of an
orange. Therefore, when the child is told that the orange also
tastes sweet the description will have only verbal meaning for
the child. And therefore the word "orange" has at this point
both verbal and sensible meaning for the child since it knows
the sight orange by acquaintance and the taste orange by
description. Suppose finally, that the child throws an orange
against a wall and that the orange thereupon emits a strange
thumping sound. The word "orange" will from then on include in
its sensible signification for the child the strange sound that
it witnessed.
It may be objected here that such accidental features as
the sound which an orange emits when thrown against a hard
7>
surf* c j does not constitute en essential pert of tl
of that word. - hermore, the ig of "orange'* is
whether anyone knows it or docs not know it, i.e., w
anyone has experienced the aspect of an orange or not. The
word in fact means ua large, roundish, many celled, j , acid
or sweet fruit enclosed in b: b, reddish-yellow, tough rind."
This objection, however, is justified only if the personal
element in the relation of reference is overlooked. If the
relation of reference is construed as a diadic one, obtaining
onl3r between names and name-able objects, then the follow: i
characterization of reference, different from Johnson 1 s, is
possible. We may distinguish meaning from referent. The
meaning of a word is a description of a set of properties as
chat of an orange above. The referent of a word, on the other
hand, is any object which satisfies that description. The
description is thought to present the essential features cf
such objects, but the objects may have an infinite number of
accidental features none of which constitute a part of the
meaning of the word which refers to them.
This theory is by no means Johnson 1 s view. For Johnson
the meaning of a word cannot be independent of knowledge-
state of s< erson, and the referent of any word consists
for that person
; of only those features of an object with
which the person is acquainted.
The .. of words is often much more coraples than our
illustration above suggests. We may distinguish, for e -e,
7o
two kinds of sensible meaning: cognitive and emotive » If a
word refers to either an external or internal phenomenon I
shall say that it has cognitive meaning. Emotive me,. 3
results when words merely purport to refer to phenomena but
receive their significance from an emotional source; as for
example,
The words eternity, heaven, hell, angel, redemption,
resurrection, faith, and many other wards of sacred
import, are connected, in religious men, with certain
internal feelings which give to the words a pungency and
unc tion.-*-
Emotive meaning is by no means restricted to words of a
religious nature. Words such as
host, witch, spectre, fairy, sorcerer, and a
multitude of other words, derive their principal signi-
fication from the internal feelings with which they are
associated.
2
It is possible, furthermore, for a person to mistake the
sensible referent of some word. This may happen in t he
following way: The word "pressure" usually "refers to the
effort of my hand against this table" and hence "names a
feel." But we are tempted to attribute the ascent of water
in a vacuum to pressure also. The word in this situation,
however, "signifies all to which we refer in proof of the
pressure."-^ That is, the word docs not in this situation
signify a feel; it signifies the entire situation of water
Ibid , , p. 160 k Loc. XI, par* 3)«
Ibid
. , p. 161 (Lee. XI, par* 7).
"'Ibid., p. 226 (Lee. XVII, par. 10).
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rising in a vacuum, and no more. Accu • ing to Johnson, a
::o^d that i such items as the ir hypo-constructs
of physics i3 significant of the experimental evid
.ociated conditions of such constructs. 3ut we frequently
make the mistake of supposing bhat ...cao expori
.
situations are not really the meaning of our words at - 11,
id that the meanings of words such as "atom," "weight,"
"pressure," "temperature," etc., are definite entities which
we happen not to be able to perceive* But our intent!-: . are
for Johnson no sufficient ground why the meaning of words which
refer to hypo-constructs should have sensible meaning which
cannot perceive. Indeed, by (T3) such claims are absurd; an;.
by definition (b) if we intend to refer to insensible entities
then the meaning of the words with which we refer to them can
be only verbal.
According to Johnson,
ich error occurs in our speculations when *..
to discriminate between the verbal meaning of a word, its
sensible meaning, and its meaning that refers to our
internal consciousness .^
If Wo v nguish between revealing mea lgs and r • :. ng
to meanings we discover an additional difference between verbal
and sensible meaning. "The senses alone can reveal to us the
sensible signification of words. "2 On the other hand, "Words
Ibid., p. 166 (Lee. XII, heading).
2_
Ibid., p. 166 (Lee. XII, par. 2).
76
can yield us nothing but the verbal signification of words . "•*
Hence, though words may refer both to sensible and to verbal
meanings, they can reveal only verbal meanings. ..'., cannot ask
a genuine question unless wo inquire into the verbal meaning of
a word. Only then can we expect our answer in words. Let us
consider an example:
Professor Brown says, 'power is nothing but
invariable antecedence.' Is it nothing but those
words? If he is speaking of the verbal signification
of power, it may be what he says «
2
If Professor Brown is seeking the verbal meaning of "power,"
then not only may we refer him to it, we may actually give it to
him, for it is clear from the above example that the verbal
meaning of words may be other words. Professor Brown may,
however, be interested in the sensible meaning of "power."
If so, only his senses can reveal it to him. Johnson indicates
the sensible meaning of "power" with the variable x to show
that it cannot be revealed by words.
Power is 5 therefore, x a 3U " Mr, Brown say., it is
invariable antecedence; therefore, invariable antecedenc
.
is the same x. The like may be said of every phrase into
which you may resolve the word power. The sensible
signification (x) remains independent of cur language,
and unaffected by it.
3
The situation here in respect to sensible meaning is clear:
the word "power" and the phrase "invariable antecedence" both
Ibid
. 5 p, 166 (Lee, XII, par, 3).
Ibid
. , p. 159 (Lee. XI, par. 1).
3Loc. cit.
signify the same :: and have therefore the. same sensible
meaning. The word and the phrase may be said to be
co-extentional; they are alternative names for the .. ame
. nsible particular* The verbal meaning of either one of
them, however, is simply the other. The- verbal
the word "power" is the p] . .ble anteccdor.ee/' or
other phrase that is suggested as a definition of the
word; and the verbal meaning of any such phrase in turn is
any other phrase, or the word "power,"
But the notion of verbal meaning here is not clear, D(
the word "power" mean the expression "invariable antecedenc
or does it mean those words? If it means the former then its
meaning is not really verbal at all (whatever verbal might
mean) but sensible, for it would then be the name of 21 i.
marks which are sensible phenomena. This however, is simply
not what the word "power" means. Hence it must i the
_____
"invariable antecedence." But what does it mean to mean words?
Is it to mean the meaning of those words? Since the ming of
words by our distinction is the individuating feature between
expressions and words, and since "power" does not mean the
expression "invariable antecedence" it follows that it must
mean the i
;
:" \n: of the phr 1 "j ble antecedence . " 1!hQ
ming of this phrase is either verbal or sensible,. Now if
"power" means the verbal meaning of "invariable antecedenc
then "power" means "power"; but if it means the sensible
meaning of those words then it me; j x. If "power" means x
&0
then It fails to have anything but sensible meaning; but if
it means itself by the other alternative, no one would
maintain that this is to have meaning in any sense.
There is yet another difficulty with this notion of
verbal meaning. Suppose that we are told that the word "glib"
means verbally the word "glub," and that they both iibly
moan y. Generally we hope that to give a verbal equivalent
to any word whose m eaning is not clear will clarify its verbal
meaning. But how can the word "glub" clarify the meaning of
the word "glib"? Only if we know what the word "glub" means.
Now "glub," according to Johnson's vi~v; '..ill mean sensibly y
and verbally "glib."' Neither of these meanings, however, will
give us an understanding of the meaning of "glib." To be told
that the word "glub" means the word "glib" is obviously
pointless. And to be told that the word "glub" means y is
redundant since we might have started bj saying that the word
"glib" means y without introducing the word "glub" at all.
Now Johnson is certainly correct when he asserts that
whether we call the object y "glib" or "glub" is Irrelevant
to determining the nature of it. Nevertheless, we constantly
offer definitions as an aid in discovering what it is that
seme word refers to. And though we cannot determine the nature
of y in this manner, we _c___ determine the reference, that is,
we can determine that it is in fact an object such as y to
which the word "glib" refers. But in order to determine ev^.:
31
sh, ou.r desij nation ,: luV' must have some ... _•
than that whj ch Johnson proposes, that is, it should in
addition to n£;3ib ri and y, something else.
This something else shall be those conditions in
of which "glib" is meaningful. Let us examine <^ concrete
example. Consider the term "unicorn" and suppose its . Ing
were n ot known to you; for example, yen would not know th
there fail to exist entities named by that word. Now 1 t is
clear that the word can be explained to you. I can begin by
toiling you that an unicorn is an animal with certain peculiar-
ities: a single, spiral horn, a horses 1 tail, etc. In fact,
I can give a definition of the word "unicorn" by listing all
its essential features, i.e., those features which any entity
must satisfy in order to be properly called a "unicorn." Only
if I have given such an explanation of features will you
able to recognize a unicorn should you h^p>..n to find one. But
the description must be understood by you. It cannot consist
of words which are unintelligible. Therefore the words of tl
description must themselVw_ have sensible referents, or must
refer to other words which have ultimate sens:.:!., referen -
with which you are acquainted. That is, in order that you
understand the description of a unicorn it is necessary ...
you know what - horn is, how ~^^~.\ an object is spiral, : a
horses' tail is, etc.
. following int tation of verbal i Lng is t 'efore
in order. A word shall have bwo refe its: a sensible referent
C2
and a string of words which is tho description of this ible
referent. The sensible referent will constitute the sensible
meaning of the word; the string of words its verbal mea]
It is possible to mean the string of words only if that str:
is understood by the person who uses the word which refers to
it; and the person understands J his string if he is acquainted
with the sensible referents of its elements. Note that this
interpretation is in accord with the earlier definition (b) of
verbal meaning. As this definition indicates, there are other
types of verbal meaning as well. Johnson writes, for example:
When words attempt more than a reference to the
revelation of our senses, the words : ay possess a verbal
meaning, but not a sensible meaning.
This situation can arise in several ways. If a blind man
uses words which name sights, his words have only verbal
meaning for him since he cannot be acquainted with their
sensible reference. But such words will have sensible meaning
for the person who has seen the sights which they name. Verbal
meaning in this sense is not reference to other words, but
reference to sensible phenomena not in the person's subjective
universe. This is quite evident with words that have no
obvious definition. If a blind man uses the word "red", it is
said to have verbal meaning for him. But the word "red" is not
definable. Johnson tells us,
[bid , j p. 17)4. (Lee. XII, par. 19).
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1 have ..-_ fy
lenomena only, as white, i n, loud, etc., an
that we have other words which sometimes
and mes words .. .still another c
words that never signify phenomena out . mly.
And he concludes:
... we may easily see why some words are def le, and
others pnot. Words are definable when they signify other
words
.
The meaning of the word "red" then, is net verbal in t
sense that it refers to v/ords but verbal in the sens, that it
fails to refer to sensible phenomena. The word may ne - 'jless
be employed significantly even by a blind man. ;i~ knows, for
example, in what connections the word is used by others (e.g.,
as a predicate of ripe fruits), and he can therefore use .
significantly. A blind man will ask for a red apple rather
than a green one because he knows that what is called "red
apple " usually tastes better than what is called "green apple."
The third possibility as stated in the definition (b) is
verbal meaning resulting from a reference lo non-sensible
"entities." According to Johnson a student of theoretical
physics
...usually acquires by his study, a knowledge of the
verbal ingenuity of man, but not a knowledge of the
sensible realities of the universe. ^
d., p. Ip2 (Lee. X, par. 12).
2
-
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p. Tfk (Lee. XII, par. 19).
Johnson has in mind the inquiries into hypo-construe ;s
which play an important role in the physical sciences, and
which have verbal meaning as long as we suppose that they
refer to imperceptible objects., We noted earlier that a
statement about atoms, for example, will have sensible mean-
ing as long as we do not attempt to make it significant of
more than the experimental data available. For this purpose
should discriminate between theoretical agents
and sensible agents. A sensible agent is so. ; ing
aich our senses discover; but a theoretical agent is
something which is only supposed to exist #1
If we attempt to refer to anything more than the
experimental data with which our theoretical agent is
connected, then our words have verbal meaning only. Verbal
meaning here means reference to non-sensible entities which
are alleged to exist*
A word may, however, have verbal meaing in several
senses at once* The word "red" may not only have verbal
meaning in the sense of failing to refer to sensible phenomena,
but also in the more positive sense of referring to words which
a person understands. Thus, for example, it might be said that
red is thai: color which lies furthest from the convex side of
a rainbow's curve,, This, however, could not be the verbal
meaning for a person without eyes for he could not understand
the description: the words "color," "rainbov.7
,
1?
"convex, : ' and
"curve," are names of sights which a blind man has not seen.
~l.-,id
. , p. 22.6 (Lee. XVII , par. 10).
i.. it may be s have
verbal meaning for they mean other words, and these words in
turn mean other words, and so forth. But I do not :
3 blind man will ever understand any of these unless they
are ultimately grounded in sense experience. ' it is, such
words will not have verbal meaning for him unless they ^re
ultimately connected with some experience. The experience
need not be a sight j it can be a feel,, Thus the word "curve"
may mean a certain feel to a blind man and hence we can say
that the word "red," explained in terms of such words as
"curve," will have verbal meaning for him ...nee he understands
the words into which the word "red" is resolved.
Similar remarks apply to words which name theoretical
agents and have verbal meaning in the third sense. These
words generally have verbal equivalents and hence have verbal
meaning in the sense of referring to other intelligible words.
I have said that ail words have a meaning by definition.
Therefore when Johnson says "When we employ a phrase without
referring to any discoverable existence or operation, the
words are divested of signification," he cannot mean that these
words are meaningless in the modern sense of the term. What
...ans to say is simply that the words do not have the
meaning that was perhaps intended for them: that wh . sensible
: is intended they actuall; re verbal meaning.
is Joh] qualifies bhe term "ins ficant" as to make
s c 1(
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ten a blind nan b ." i of colours, the word is
sensibly insignificant to hi and every word i3
equally insignificant to u .. ... it refers to t
external universe, and attempts to . - of what c
senses cannot discover,^
It is contextually clear that when Johnson says "e
.
ly
insignificant" he really means "equally sensibly insignificant,"
Occasionally, however, Johnson T s exclamations regarding bhe
lack of sensible referents are aite vociferous: he speaks of
words as "empty salvos," "vacated sounds partaking of nullity,"
or entities returning to their "pristine insignficancy, " Bus
here again the words are not entirely meaningless, and the
verbal meaning which they do have is often only a relative
matter, that is, words usually have verbal meaning only because
of the limitations of the subjective universe of any given
person who uses them. Should that person's experience be
enhanced by further sense information, his word3 may well
find sensible meaning*
Ibid , a p. dbS (Lee, XIX, par. 5)
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LAN E . ^OCl IN - CQUISn -
osition of Johnson's semantics presei n the
1 chapter suggests a number of i. quest: Dna
coviczmi-j, language, knowledge and communication. Some of
these questions find an answer in Johnson's later writ:
the answer to others must remain largely conjGctu.ro* Th
folic. questions are the oasis for bhe present discussion:
(1) What is the nature of the defects which language is said
to contain?
(2) What are the limitations of language, and hat does
Johnson propose to do in regard tc bhem?
(3) Is Johnson willing to abandon ordinary language, :. a he
. jrely propose a reform, or does he \ h to leave it z.z
it is?
(ij.) is Johnson 1 s conception of knowledge? Is this
conception adequate?
(5>) Does Johnson prefer sensible knowledge and disparage
verbal knowledge?
(6) What is the relation of language to knowledge? Is
! suage capable of adding to our knowledge? Is
communication of knowledge possible?
Language and Linguistic Principles
In an attempt to mark the limits of significant discouj
Johnson in bhe course of his
________
-- sura to expose the
capabilities and inc.. ilities of language. Two types of
Lty rr:u_.t be dist 3d. Language is said to conta:
.
. which are a : lial features of it that can lead
-to errors; and it has limitations , by which I shall mean
that there exist functions which language is unable to
perform. I shall say, further, that a defect differs from a
limitation in that it is a feature which could in principle
be corrected. A limitation, on the other hand, is a
restricted function, or inability, which is intrinsic and
incorrigible
.
Let us now inquire whether Johnson believes that
language contains defects in the above sense. We are t old
that, since language is of great importance in human activity,
...the duty is imperative of becoming acquainted
with its defects; especially if it contains any which
have hitherto escaped detection: --and such it actually
contains .-
We discover subsequently 'chat the two most prominent
"defects" in language are its artificiality and its general:.-/.
The distinction between verbal a nd sensible entities indicates
that there exist major differences between words and objects.
V.
rords are only the signs of objects, and objects signified are
the meaning of words. But words are not identical with their
meaning--a simple insight which is frequently disregarded. We
erroneously think that words are the objects which they only
signify, or that they are so much like such objects, that we
are prone to take words for objects. But words arc, artificial:
As bank notes are the artificial representatives
"Johnson, A Treatise on ''.. - : i ::s , cp. c i t . , p. 31 (Lee. I,
par . 6 )
.
of specie, so words are the ... ;ial represer
of natural ; La.-*-
nerality in lar.. 3 is said to be ar. set
leading to vacuous speculation. "The generality of langua
is an irremediable defect in its sti . "^ Since
phenomena are particular yet exhibit certain sj pities,
and sir.ee phenomena of different senses are frequently i De-
lated, language designates many phenomena and associations of
phenomena by one name. In this consists the . of
Ian . Unfortunately, the fact that phenomena anc assoc-
iations of phenomena arc thus named by a single word has
caused much erroneous speculation about the universe and j
objects. Among the errors that occur are the suppositio] .
that universals exist, that theoretical agents exist as specific
units, that nature exhibits identities, and that un: ... such as
complex particulars are no different than units such as non-
complex basic particulars .3
The curious thing about these features of language is
that they are said to be irremediable
.
The verbal defect ..eh these discourses will
5 scuss, are inseparable from language, and differ from
y defects that you may anticipate...! also allude to
none that can be obviated. The most I hope to perfc
is to make them known .*+
Ibid., p. 174 (Lee. XII, ..ar. If
p. 57 (Lee. Ill, par. ij.) .
.. s J. ff ..hove.
*
I
'
.., p. 33 (Lee. I, par. 9).
;:
But if certain features of language which are said to
! .jo errors in speculation cannot be obviated, then is the
any reason in calling them "defects"? Or is Johnson
in supposing that they are inescapable, and therefore correct
in regarding them as defective? We find in the Trsa
occasional reference to an "ideal language" which, if it
existed, would avoid generality by containing enough words in
its vocabulary to provide eVery particular with a proper name.
If such a language were possible then it would constitute a
genuine alternative to ordinary language in respect to
generality » And therefore, since generality is in principle
escapaale, we are correct in calling the occurence of
generality in ordinary language a "defect" in the sense
discussed above.
But is a language consisting entirely of proper names
possible? Johnson observes:
. .
.were we to invent a separate name for every
sight which we now denominate white, language would be
.
too voluminous for utility, and perhaps for our memory. J-
White is applied to snow, to'chis paper, to t -
glass which composes our windows... A perfect language
should have a separate word for each of these appearances,
and a separate word for every other phenomenon; but lar
thus precise would be too copious for our memory.
-
Thus there are practical difficulties involved in the
acquisition of an ideal language. Nevertheless, it would
"
" '
•
:.- d
. , p. 5? (Lee. Ill, par. If).
1 : d
. , p. 113 (Lee. VII, introduction).
seem that if we were prepared to ac. bhe b . of
prolixity, we may avo: lity if we so desire. .. slose
examination of the ideal Ian 3 reveals, he
prcl :. would be so exte e as to make it ir a >] for
anyone, even with the best intentions, to k she ns i
all objects. Indeed, the vocabulary of this lage
would have to be infinite since words are >le
objects. Moreover, there are other difficulties with such a
language. John Locke correctly observed th
. .
.a distinct name for ^articular Id
not be of any great use for the improvement of _:e
;
ich, though founded in part:'. s lings, enlarges
itself by general views; to which iuced into
sorts under general names, are properly subservient .1
And finally there is some question whether such a s;
of words deserves to be called a "language" at all. Locke tells
us in respect to such a system:
If it were possible, it would yet be useless; because
it would not 3erve to the chief end of ' lage . M
would in vain heaa up names of particular- .. :
would not serve them to communicate their thoughts ,2
The prerequisite to successful communication, according to
Locke, is that those who wish to communicate must share similar
ideas. Only if my words excite ideas in you which are similar
to ideas bhat ... words are the ls of in me, can I
of my thought, or of new knowledge. But if all
•/per names then either what I say is unintelligible to you,
.3 can Locke, Ar
\
ry n ~ " r , Book
III, Chapter II, par"^ IjT.
~_
-
,
par. 3.
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or else the information that I give you is not new. Ji >n
recognizes this problem also but makes no reference to it
until in his last work on semantics. He re . ire: "...
men converse together about only such things as they t .,
in identity, but little verbal communication would be possible. "-
There is therefore little reac^:. in rejecting ordinary
language, or in calling its features "defects." I shall
indicate that Johnson's tendency is to gradually come to
regard generality as an asset and not a defect. This attitu
is particularly conspicuous in his later writings in -which he
frequently asserts that the "ineradicable ambiguity of language
is a blessing rather than an evil."^ But how, it may be asked,
can generality be a blessing when, as we s aw in the second
section of Chapter I, a host of errors is attributed to it?
Are these errors perhaps not caused by generality?
From some passages in John.: a a _a .':..„ w ... __ ac-
tion between language and linguistic discourse is necessary.
Some sections of the '-"aact:./ .. a^al with language, a system of
sounds used as signs of phenomenal other sections deal with
linguistic discourse, or the employment of such a system of
signs. The difference, I think, is crucial. Ordinary
language is, as Wittgenstein later said, in order as it is. It
is only linguistic discourse, as Johnson recognizes in some
passages at least, which is defective. Errors occur not because
Johnson,
[
\\e hysiolop-y of tia. • es , op >> cit . , p. 2l\.
^Johnson,
_
.
Treatis
___ , op_. cit ., p. 31 (Lee. I,
par. 6)
.
lan$ ;hem, but because bhe users of
not understand its features and hence frequently abui 3 It.
Johnson writes
:
rbal u:/ courj 3e contains defects v have
escaped detection.! ("my italic
...when you r 3 c one lus Ions of
phye.. : ;y, and chym not inJ
such doctrines are incontestible by logick ;he doctri]
re repugnant to re : than the belief ihat . Dine
in the by whi zh zhe
doctrines are expressed, or in the processes by which
the doctrines are sustained?2
rler.ee v.; o may s lat it is not ! ;uage but linguisti
discourse which Johnson recognizee "co be defective. Generality
and artificiality, as well a~ any other feature of 1 age, are
not defects. These features, however, are responsible for
certain limitations of language and these , in turn, govern the
extent of significant linguistic usage. Artificiality, for
example, is responsible for the limitation of language in
respect to its ability to reveal sensible knowledge; and this
! itation imposes restrictions on r ingful discourse.
Though the producers of language, the authors of metaphysics,
eoretical physics, and other speculation, are most frequently
cited by Johnson as misusing language , the cor ersj or the
readers of such works, are equally responsible as atuators
o- *'.-. ..^ -r-rors. The producers employ language; the
con^ .. : (interpret the results and bhereby aggrav^-c
., p. 5^ (Lee. I, par, 7).
2
Ibj [., p. 33 (Lee. I, par, 1 .
perversion. So much then for the alleged defects of language.
Let us now discuss the 1 .ions which arc induced by i
:
ecial construction. We pass therefore to the second
question: What aro the limitations of language, and what does
Johnson propose to do in regard to them?
Most of the major linguistic principles that ellucidate
the limitations of language are derivable from the two features
of language that I have discussed--artif iciality and generality
—
in conjunction with the theorems of Johnson's epistemology*
Part of the notion of artificiality is contained in the followj
statement which Johnson regards as assarting an essential
property of language
;
Every word is a sound, which had no signification
before "was employed to name some phenomenon, ai
which even now has no signification apart from the
phenomena to which it is applied<,3-
Thus we find that language is artificial in the sense that
meanings are given to certain sounds, or, certain sounds are
used as names of objects, and the connection is established
quite arbitrarily. The quotation bears out in addition the
important fact that language is dependent on phenomena for its
significance. Arbitrary designation and dependence on phenomena,
however, are not the only aspects of artificiality. The
seemingly trivial but highly impc. ; .a fact that language is
not identical with its meanings, that is, words are only t
"..bid,
, p. 97 (Lee* VI, introduction).
.representatives of objects and not the objects c Lowledg
themselves, must ~lso bo r .zed s~ determ: ific-
Lity, The folic principle, I
a basis for all the others \ Johnson wishes to derive
from the artificiality of 1 jage:
*C3 '
(?1) Expr ..ns , which r»ds
when bhey are arbitraril _ neeI to . . of
which they are only imperfect repi -ations.
The above principle ent .ils, in conjunction with
theorems, Johnson's central insight concerning the relation
between language and sensible knowledge. The follow:.
quotations bs clear what Johnson has in mind regarding
this relation:
.-. the Lord answered from the flaming bush the
inquiry of Moses, by saying 'I ar it '. , ' tl
an. nderfully expressive of the nature of
languagOj which c - 10 instance accomplish more
lan it ^iffected in that.l
jrds may direct my attention to what I b .Id
nc u have otherwise noted in x, but they can:',
to me any part of x,--they cannot perform the _vice
of the senses*
2
This point, which is unc; _ic..„jLy Johnson's majc
contention throughout the T
___
as well as in his later
writings, may be formulated in the folio, i principle:
(P2) Language is limited in its exposition: it cannot provide
sensible knowledi ^ thou h it may lead us to it.
±-r>~s
'
:
: .
,. , p. 2iji| (Lee. X] _ 11).
Ibj . 3 p, 166 (Lee. XII, par,. 2)*
-The above principle may be derived in several different
ways* ight simply say th* scording to (T2) only the
senses provide us with sensible knowledge. Lang-uage, which is
obviously not a sense but merely the object of sev..
cannot therefore reveal anything. It may indeed r 1 itself
through the senses. But by (Pi) language is not identical
with it? objects. Hence though it may reveal itself it cannot
reveal meanings.
Another possible derivation is bhe following. Words
are sounds or sights. Suppose that the object named by s:
word is either a taste, a feel 3 or a i:.._'_l. ~ - 'i'2) we cannot
know such an object when hearing or seeing the word which names
it 3 because a sound or sight cannot reveal a taste, feel, or
smell. Now suppose that the object which a word names is either
a sound or a sight, different from the sound or sight of t he
word. 3y (Ti|) it is clear that from the word alone we cannot
sensibly know its object, because no sight can reveal any other
sight.
(Th.) therefore suggests another simple derivation. By
(PI) we know that vjords are not identical with their meanings.
Hence a word either refers to knowledge that we already possess,
and reveals no new sensible knowledge, or it refers to sensible
objects which we have not experienced and which, by (TI4.), we
cannot know.
A final derivation might be the follow ing one: 3y (PI)
we find that words ac | 'e their connection with objects
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arb: , ... :e by (To) we shall not
of the word is associated with its at unl -.. /o
previously ex zed this coi - >n. And o;-co : ;._-r.
either already know the object of . , ~.- ,f_^ . . ... .
ar ..rid the word.
nterestj rinciples dealing with the nature of
questions may be derived from [Pi] and (P2)
:
(?3) All questions which relate "oo the external universe
st be directed to our senses.^
Since language cannot reveal its objects, and sine..
questions about the nature of objects ne' - occur,
such questions must bo d^.^^'jod to t he senses, the sole revesl-
ers of phenomena. Johnson observes cleverly:
This asking what :... t is thought, etc.,
aceeds on ;he supposition t! . teness, etc., is net
itself, but something else. Nor- in all cases, white
or thought, etc., is itself. Words car sr us t o the
3xist nee which we name whiteness, but words can effect re
more .2
The next principle describes the conditions undei Lch a
question directed to the senses is intelligible:
(Pii) .-. question ..•"rich the senses cannot answer is insignificant.
3
Ibid
., p. 2l\.2 (Lee. XIX, par. 2).
bid
. , p. 26v. (Lee. . par. 11).
"____*> p. 2I|.2 (Lee. XIX, par, 3)«
?8
If a question inquires after somethi: - at cannot b .
given by our senses then it 1 >fers to soi .is not
sensible, for example to nothing. But by (PI) expressions
become words, and thereby sensibly me lir ;ful, only if th
are made the signs of some phenomena. Hence a question such
as the above is sensibly meaningless, Johnson adduces a n
of examples of meaningless questions si ... as the following:
hat is the shape of a taste, or the color of a
sound? The questions are insij . cant. They inquire
after no information of our senses,, Every interrogation
which cos. ses a similar defect, is equally t. ig,
provided the question relates to the external universe, 4-
Thus language may pose questions, but its inquisition is
limited in two ways: questions must be directed to the senses
if sensible answers are d< ided, and they must inquire only
about things which are amenable to perception.
The next principle is a result of expanding (?2) by
enumerating various forms of linguistic exposition. It is
clear that whatever form language may take, whatever
phraseology we choose, sensible knowledge, by (?2) , cannot be
achieved through language*
(?5>) Explanations, descriptions, interpretations; and
analysis of the universe provide no sensible knowledge.
A theory of nature is not possible if it is alleged to
provide knowledge of the universe. Physics tells us that
matter is constructed in certain ways, is governed by certain
• , p. 21^2 (Lee. XIX, par, 2).
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laws , and ben . specific ways. But informs
us o:
1 is lot sensible knowledge, ata jnts
refer lo experimental ev: 1 be perceiv ...
_~ i ng in this ily Jc
is wij ':c cl_. - ;e his own writing because it ioes not
provide sensible knowledge to his r< s. After giving en
analysis of the universe he for iple
:
lysis is artifi le universe can be
correctly expounded by it.... ..one.
You . ct of my
is to subordinate language to nature. To
instruction I m p( ss some of to
natural existences; but if to kn
/ is 3 you r t - .as
well .11 others, and cc. late the ee
externally with your senses, and internally with
your consciousness.!
Fhe principles which I have . 3 - .r discussed are c«: .
not the only ones which could be deduced from the artificiality
of language , though bhey are certainly the most ctant. In
the conclusion of the Tr Johnson lists a -. r of
principles which he considers most significant. Only (?2) and
a weaker version cf (PI) are included in his list.
Generality gives rise to many other principles. Df these
I shall list the salient ones without ee entary, use a
thorough discussion of this topic has been given earlier,
2
(P6) Language is prj ily a of general
1.
,
p. 161 (Lee. X! , 9)
9 pag >s 5lff above •
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(P7) General names frequently apply to complex particulars
without specifying their constituents,
(?8) The same word is often applied to phenomena which
exhibit various degrees of similarity.
(P9) Words sometimes name "objects" which have no real
existence
•
Let us now speculate about what Johnson might wish to do
in respect to the limitations explicit in the above principles.
Obviously, he wishes to make his principles , and thereby the
limitations of language, known to his readers; he hopes to
establish them with sufficient illustrations—of which,
incidentally, he adduces an enormous quantity—and he surely
wishes that his principles will be heeded. What I would like
to investigate, however, is whether Johnson is prepared to go
further than this. I come therefore to my third question: Is
Johnson willing to abandon ordinary language, does he merely
propose a reform, or does he wish to leave language as it is?
The answer is not clear since there are passages in Johnson
which would seem to support each one of these alternatives.
These passages must now be examined in detail and possibly
reconciled,,
I have mentioned previously that since an ideal language
is practically impossible, as Johnson realizes, there would
therefore appear to be ovidence that he wishes not to alter
ordinary language but at best reform its usage, or the
employment, interpretation and estimation which is given to it.
1C1
A revised estimation of language involves putting it into
the proper perspective; and the proper perspective for
language is a subordination to nature:
My lectures will endeavour to subordinate language
to nature, --to make nature the expositor of words,
instead of making words tho expositors of nature.!
A subordination of language to nature involves an
appreciation for the difference between words and things, and
an appreciation for (PI), (?2) and their implications. To
this end Johnson appears to favor now ways of speaking:
Should a person point to an object, and ask me what
it is, I might answer, it is a sight and a feel,
children are so accustomed to such answers from me, that
they never address me as above. They ask me to tell them
the name of the object. This question keeps the nan
distinct from the object, and gives language its proper
subordination to created existences.
3
Emphasising tho importance of perception and the need to
subordinate words to phenomena in order to avoid an attempt to
perceive in nature what words suggest that we should be able
to perceive, Johnson says:
If you have succeeded in catching my analysis, you
no longer see in the heavens, light, clouds, sun, galaxy,
moon, stars, meteors, space, vacuity, distance, shape,
etc., but you see various sights, to which the above
words are names. I|.
Ibid
.
,
p. I4.O (Lee. I, par. Hj.) .'
2
Ibid
., p. 56 (Lee. Ill, par. 3).
•
^Ibid
. p. f>ij. (Lee. II, par. 22).
Ibid., p. Sk- (Lee. II, par. 23).
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A different employment of language, which appears to
accompany its subordination, is not only preferable in tho
every-day discourse of Johnson and his children, but is
highly desirable in certain philosophical speculations,
saw earlier that Johnson devised an improvement of specula-
tive discourse by the introduction of word indexing. To
avoid speculative errors, words which name complex particulars
should be split and labelled. Thus the term orange will lead
to no difficulties if we adopt a five-fold terminology: orange^,
orange , etc. The fact that Johnson is confident that errors
in speculation j an be avoided, which is clear in the following
quotation, suggests that there are successful remedies such as
the word indexing above. He tells us:
Verbal disquisitions will be erroneous till we
cease from imputing to nature the identities which
belong to language .. .this truth must be learned before
we can extricate ourselves from the errors in which
nearly all verbal disquisitions are involved.
2
The point I wish to stress here is that even though
language cannot be changed, that is, the limitations of
language cannot be obviated, we can nevertheless extricate
ourselves from the errors of linguistic discourse. A more
specific vocabulary, for example, will help preclude errors
which arise through our inattention to the generality of
language, yet such a vocabulary will not affect generality
See page 60 above.
Ibid., p. 86 (Loc. V, par. 19).
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in the way an ideal language would. Beside-3, the difficulties
with generality do not even arise in most ordinary discourse,
Thoy occur primarily in speculation:
This versatility of language produces little
embarrasment in the ordinary concerns of life, but
in speculation it occasions controversy and confusion. *-
V/e apply a word to numerous cases which we deem
homogenous or analogous. Practically, no evil arises,
for wo interpret the word by the sensible revelation
to which it is applied, --deeming Caesar at one moment
a dog, and at another moment a Roman emperor. In
speculation, however, we interpret the natural
existence by its name .2
The answer to our present question therefore appears to
be the following: Johnson does not want to abandon ordinary
language, nor does he wish to leave it entirely as it is.
fow restricted modifications of our employment of words, along
with a recognition and appreciation of the principles, is
probably sufficient to avoid most linguistic mistakes.
Some passages in the T] eatise t however, appear not to
support this interpretation of Johnson's intentions. We are
told, for example:
That language will eventually receive the
construction for which I contend, I feel no doubt,
though I may not possess the talent to introduce
the reformation.
3
The passage suggests that Johnson is discontented with
the ordinary construction of language and feels that it can,
Ibid
. , p. 113 (Lcc. VII, introduction).
2Ibid
., p. 276 (Lcc. XXIV, par u 3).
3Ibid., p. J;0 (Lcc. I, par. i£) .
10i|
and must bo altered. Curiously enough the same passage is
quoted by Drake as follows
:
•That language will eventually receive b i
interpretation for which I contend,, I cannot doubt;
but that 1 possess the ability to make existing
errours perceived even, I much question. si (ray italics)
Both of these statements are probably Johnson's since
we are dealing here with two different works, but I shall
accept Johnson's statement quoted by Drake as indicative of
his intentions, and these are clearly consistent with my
previous interpretation. The interpretation is not arbitrary,
but it is based on the following consideration: in one of the
lectures of the Treatise the principles which Johnson discusses
throughout are referred to as "rules of interpretation. "^
Since the principles represent Johnson's major ideas, I think
that it is fair to conclude that his interest is in the
interpretation of ordinary language rather than in the
construction of an alternative to it.
A number of passages in the Tre seem to suggest
that we ought to abandon language entirely. Thus, for example,
in his conclusion Johnson declares:
Instead of contemplating creation through the
medium of words, men should contemplate creation
itself. Thev should estimate what their senses
Quoted in Stillman Drake, A. B. Johnson and his Works on
Language, 1 ' op_. cit
. ,
p. 233. An error has occurred in the
citation of these passages for both Drake and Rynin place their
respective quotations in Johnson's second book.
2Ibid .. p. 162 (Lee. XI, par. 10).
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disclose, and tho phenomena which they experience
internally. . . 1
We are told, also, that verbal processes n~^hon pursued to
their ultimate limits, lead to absurdities," 2 and that "ve are
compelled to eventually abandon our verbal processes. "3
Now I think that it is correct to say that Johnson advises
us to ignore language after
_
cei-u.-ln point . The abandonment,
as well as the subordination of language, must, however, be
interpreted in the light of (P5)« Because language cannot
provide sensible knowledge it must be subordinated to nature
at all times, and ultimately abandoned.
We may fabricate theories and definitions, but we
cannot enlarge our knowledge of the external universe
by an arrangement of words, any more than a conjurer
can look into futurity by arranging the figures of a
pack of capds.M-
We cannot enlarge our sensible knowledge by
words.
5
Thus it is clear at what point language must be abandoned.
It must be abandoned ;%rhen it has served its function of refer-
ence; when it has guided us to sensible knowledge which only
our senses reveal, it cannot do more. If nevertheless we
expect it to do more, if we continue to
Ibid .
, p. 299 (Conclusion).
2Ibid
., p. 206 (Lee. XV, par. 20).
3lbid
.
,
p. 205 (Lee. XV, par. 16).
Ibid
. p. 2/4-5 (Lee. XIX, par. 4).
^Ibid
.
, p. 172 (Lcc. XII, par. li|).
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employ it in a vain attempt to acquire sensible knowledge, then
we are led to errors, absurdities and vacuous speculations,
Sensible and Verbal Knowledge
I have been speaking of what Johnson calls "sensible
knowledge" all this time, and I have indicated some of the
features of its relation to language. Johnson's conception of
knowledge, however, is not entirely clear. We are told, for
example, that language can provide verbal knowledge, and we
wonder what sort of knowledge this is, what its connection with
sensible knowledge is, and which of these types of knowledge,
if any, Johnson favors. Thus I come to my third question:
What is Johnson 1 s conception of knowledge? Is this conception
adequate?
At several points in Chapter . I Johnson's conception of
knowledge was introduced and some important aspects of it were
briefly discussed. I indicated, for example, that the
distinction between sensible and verbal entities can be extended
to include types of meaning and types of knowledge. Sensible
knowledge is roughly our knowledge of the universe, both
external and internal, while everything else is verbal
knowledge. I indicated somewhat later that the distinction
between verbal and sensible knowledge is roughly equivalent to
the well-known distinction between knowledge by description
1
and knowledge by acquaintance
.
See page 27 above.
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It would be unfair to interpret Johnson' a notion of
sensible knowledge by saying that sensible knowledge, or
knowledge of the universe, is identical with perception.
Certainly the information which we acquire through perception
constitutes one important part of sensible knowledge.
Johnson tells us in a later work that our knowledge is "wholly
derived from the senses,"! a view quite popular among his
empiricist contemporaries. But a great deal of information
derived from the senses is not immediately Riven to us by them.
Indeed, sensations are the only items which are directly given
through perception, and sensations alone surely do not
constitute sensible knowledge. We learn much more through
the senses: x^e learn, for example, that a certain feel is
associated with a certain sight. But we do not find this
through direct sensation. The association is learned through
experience , and hence Johnson speaks of experience in
formulating (T6), telling us that the prediction of associa-
tions among phenomena must be based upon some past experience.
Similarly, many other relations among phenomena are not
directly perceived, yet they ar-e in some sense derived from
our sense organs. I shall therefore regard sensible knowledge
as consisting of ail the information that is given in experience
of which direct perception is only a small part. It is clear
that this conception of sensible knowledge is identical with
Johnson, The Physiology of ____op_, o_p. cit . , introduction.
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what is frequently called "knowledge by acquaintance,'*
Verbal knowledge and. knowledge by description arc not
identical* When I defined "verbal meaning" I remarked that
words have verbal meaning in three different manners . A
word is verbally meaningful if it refers to other words, if
it refers to objects in the objective universe relative to
some knower, or if it refers to non-sensible entities. This
triple distinction applies to verbal knowledge as well. Such
knowledge may be either (1) knowledge of words; (2) knowledge
of the entities which someone else is capable of describing to
us; and (3)> knowledge of non-sensible entities. Let us
examine all three of these in detail.
What can be meant by knowledge of words in the present
context? Clearly, lexiographical knowledge 3 etymological
knowledge, knowledge of phonetics or the study of empirical
linguistics is not meant. To know words must for Johnson
mean either to know certain sounds or sights, that is, to
know words as physical entities; or it must mean to know the
meaning of those words. It is clear that if the former of
these alternatives is intended, then a group of words designed
to convey information will be meaningless. Even a person who
does not understand the language will know words in that sense.
But no person could claim to understand these sights or sounds,
to recognize them as symbols of other objects; and hence no
3-See page 72 above.
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person can regard these phenomena as meaningful; they are not
words at all but merely expressions.
No writer ever intends to give verbal "knowledge" in tl
above sense. Indeed, it appears in Johnson that this situation
arises inadvertently. When a writer intends some meaning which
his words cannot possibly have, when he disccurses of "objects"
which no sense could ever apprehend, then his words frequently
mean nothing at all because they refer to nothing, and therefore
when this writer produces his words he is really producing a
collection of sights* Mote here that this kind of verbal
knowledge is certainly not identical with knowledge by
description. The latter is thought to be meaningful informa-
tion; the former however consists of mere sights and sounds
without any meaning. I doubt, finally, whether it deserves to
be called knowledge at all, even when qualified as "verbal."
Fortunately there are other and more significant types of
verbal knowledge.
Words may mean the meaning of other words. This topic
was discussed at length in Chapter I, and I shall therefore
merely indicate the results of that discussion. When words
mean other words it is possible to gain a significant type of
verbal knowledge provided that the- words to which reference is
made are themselves meaningful. That is, these words must
•^See pages 79ff above.
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either refer directly to sensible phenomena, or indirectly
to such phenomena by mean3 of other words to which they refer
directly. Thu3 a description of a centaur is verbally
meaningful and hence provides verbal knowledge when the
constituents of that description refer to phenomena which
the reader has experienced.
The second type of verbal knoxvledge which I have
distinguished is, like the one above, more obviously akin to
knowledge by description,, Each person's subjective universe
contains objects which are capable of being described by him
to someone else whose subjective universe does not contain
them. An individual who hears or sees a description of some
object which he has never experienced will obtain verbal
knowledge in two senses: first in the above sense in which
the words of the description are meaningful since they refer
to phenomena which he has experienced, and secondly in the
sense in which he knows of the existence of the object which
is being described to him. He knows that the object exists
and he knows this verbally. Though he has not experienced this
object, he nevertheless is not entirely ignorant of it for he
knows, furthermore, certain facts about it due to the informa-
tion given by the description. If he does not understand this
description, however, he can claim to have verbal knowledge
only in the relatively trivial sense of knowing certain sounds
or sights.
Ill
Thus I have actually distinguished three different
sorts of verbal knowledge among these first two types.
Verbal knowledge resulting from reference to words is an
ambiguous notion, for it could either mean knowledge of
sounds or sights, or knowledge of a meaningful description.
Thus the knowledge gained through reference to words is
distinguishable into a relatively inconsequential and a more
significant type of verbal knowledge. Finally, the second
type originally distinguished results from reference to
objects which have not been experienced by the person who
gains verbal knowledge from a description of them.
It is interesting here that in order for verbal
knowledge to be significant it must be at least
,
rounded in
experience. A description of some unexperienced object is
intelligible only if the phenomena referred to by its elements
have been experienced. On the other hand, when verbal
knowledge is insignificant as explained above, then it
actually _is sensible knowledge since sights and sounds are
sensible phenomena even though they are only words. But it
is clear that only the significant type of verbal knowledge
is equivalent to what is called "knowledge by description."
That knowledge by description—which is what we may call
this second type of verbal knowledge—must be sensibly
grounded in order to be intelligible is recognized by Johnson:
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A verbal description of an?/ unknown sight, is
sensibly intelligible to a man by means only of the
sights he has seen, and the intelligibility is accurate
to the extent only that his known sights approximate
to the unknown. The more we enlarge our acquaintance
with sights, the more we enlarge our capacity for
proximately understanding verbal descriptions of sights
which we have not seen, A child who has never seen a
sailing vessel larger than a canoe, and water larger
than a brook, and a fish larger than an eel, would
derive but little accurate information from the
description of a sea voyage in quest of whales.*
Before considering some special difficulties raised by
the above notion of verbal knowledge I would like to mention
the third type, which is equally important and which has
similar connections with sensible knowledge. One would think
that knowledge of non-sensible entities certainly would not
involve any sort of sensible knowledge. But the situation here
is practically the same as with knowledge by description. In
order for a string of words to be intelligible it must make
reference somewhere to sensible phenomena ^ no matter whether
an object of the objective universe or a non-sensible "object"
is being described. It may make such reference directly, or
indirectly through other words e
By knowledge of non-sensible entities several things may
be meant. The theoretical knowledge of physics purports to
deal with entities not amenable to perception. But according
to Johnson "Every theory and theoretical agent are significant
of the sensible information to which they refer. "^ "Universal
1Ibid., p. 23.
2Johnson, ?reatise, op. cit
. , p. 235 (Lee. XVIiI, par. 19)
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gravitation," for example, "signifies the particulars only
to which it refers. n^ Certain experimental data, certain
observations which are adduced as evidence for the existence
of a hidden force or power, are actually ail that can be
meant by the word "gravity," The speculations of philosophers,
in a similar manner, frequently constitute this third type of
verbal knowledge. But again, in order to be intelligible,
even such speculations must somewhere be grounded in sense
experience. Finally, mathematics, logic and all other
deductive sciences are also included in this third type. Yet
even these seemingly pure verbal systems have, according to
Johnson, a connection with experience. Ee explains the
cogency of valid reasoning, or that of the laws of logic, in
terms of sense experience. In speaking of the law of
excluded middle Johnson remarks:
The necessity for our assent to such propositions
is founded on our sensible experience: thus, I can
3how you a knife, and tell you that the knife is
visible, I can remove the knife, and tell you it is
invisible. But why cannot the knife be both visible
and invisible at the same time? Try if you can effect
such a coincidence, and y ou will discover why. The
impossibility is what you will experience. It
possesses no other meaning*^
And of deductive argumentation Johnson believes that "The
ultimate cogency of all reasoning refers to our sensible
experience. "3
1Ibid., p. 128 (Lee. VIII, par. 8).
ibid .
, p. 195 (Lcc. IV, par, 2).
Vbid., p. 218 (Lee, XVI, par. 17).
In general we may assert that verbal knowledge, if it
is deserving of the appellation "knowledge" ought to have a
basis in sense experience. For this reason it may be
helpful to distinguish sensible knowledge from sensibly
grounded knowledge and not to regard the knowledge of
expressions as real knowledge at all. For even when words
literally mean only other words 5 the words referred to must
surely be intelligible before we can claim to possess verbal
knowledge. Johnson speculates in one place:
What is conscience, hope, faith, courage? The
natural meaning is what we can discover by our
consciousness, while the verbal meaning is such a
definition as approved authority shall have
imposed.
.
©What is conscience? The moral sense.
What is the moral sense? A. And what is A? B.
What is B? The process admits of no end, for the
last answer is as questionable as the first*^-
But a word such as "consciousness" surely does not mean
the sounds of its definition. In order to know the meaning
of this word wo must be able to understand its definition.
Johnson, however, does not make this point clear in his
early work. Later we shall see that he expands and thereby
completes his conception of knowledge by the addition of
intellections, i.e., certain concepts to which such words as
"consciousness" refer to, and which therefore are made
2legitimate objects of knowledge* In the Treatise however,
Ibid
., p. 269 (Lee. XXIII, par. 12).
2
For a discussion of the notion of an intellection see
Chapter III, pages 139ff below.
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Johnson's conception of verbal knowledge is not sufficiently
analysed, a discrepancy in his work which is possibly due to
his curious predilection for sensible knowledge. Sensible
knowledge is all important; verbal knowledge is merely
the result of a failure to achieve the intended sensible
knowlodge. Thus the whole Treatise is an attempt to stress
the significance of sensible knowledge, the importance of
sensible meaning, the need to have sensible referents for all
words, the conditions under which sensible knowledge can or
cannot be obtained, etc. Verbal knowledge, on the other hand,
appears to be neglected, and is nowhere mentioned in the
conclusion of the Treatise ,, Indeed, verbal knowledge appears
to be disparaged and rendered much inferior to, and less
significant than, sensible knowledge.
Thus I come to my fifth question: Does Johnson prefer
sensible knowledge and disparage the importance of verbal
knowledge? At the very beginning of the Treatise the reader
is told that "We are in danger of wasting time in verbal
investigations."! The reason appears to be that
V.
re mistake words for the ultimate objects of
knowledge; while the revelations of nature are
properly the ultimate objects .2 (my italics)
Nature evolves before us her phenomena. These
are important, whether we note them or not, or discuss
them or not; and we are acted on and act in this
evolution of realities without the slightest deference
Ibid
. , p. 30 (Lee. I, par. 3).
Ibid., p. 293 (Lee. XXIX, heading).
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to our speculations, though in our discussions
we seem to suppose that the evolutions of natur<
are controlled by our verbal decisions.'
Note here that we have the beginning of a misunder-
standing about the kind of verbal knowledge which is said
to result from a reference to words. Knowledge of expressions,
on the o ne hand, is spurious; only the knowledge of significant
descriptions can be regarded as real knowledge. Mere words
are not the ultimate objects of knowledge, but neither are
phenomena all of the time. Frequently verbal knowledge is
based on sense experience, or finds its objects in concepts.
This slight oversight causes Johnson to underestimate the
importance of verbal knowledge throughout the Treatise a We
find in another lecture, for example, that "The scholar /tsj
wasting in the contemplation of a few propositions," and wo
are requested to leave, with Johnson, such fields of
speculative imagination and "return to the slow exploration
of a single avenue of knowledge . "^ (my italics)
Why is verbal investigation a waste of time? Is not
verbal knowledge, gained through verbal investigation, a
rather important—if indeed not
_
important—branch of
human learning? When Johnson speaks of a single avenue of
knowledge, and of the revelations of our senses as constituting
the only proper objects of knowledge he is speaking of sensible
1Ibid., p. 298 (Lee. XXIX, par. 12).
2Ibid., p. 112 (Lee. VII, introduction)
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knowledge. Xo one can question that sensible knowledge can
be gained only through the senses. But it is questionable
whether sensible knowledge is knowledge in the important
sense.
Johnson compares the knowledge of Professor Brown in
respect to the word "power" with the knowledge of a boy:
A boy who fires a squib to show you that a spark
possesses power to ignite gunpowder, differs verbally
only from Professor Brown, who insists that what t
boy calls power in the spark, is only an invariable
antecedence. All that is sensible is alike in both,
and all that is not sensible is verbal only; and
cannot be thought of even, except in words,
1
We cannot argue here with Johnson's contention that
both the Professor and the boy possess the same sensible
knowledge. But the example here makes rather clear the
mistaken value judgement of Johnson when he supposes sensible
knowledge important, and verbal knowledge insignificant. The
verbal knowledge of the Professor differs a great deal indeed
from that of the boy; it differs so much in fact that we are
prone to call the Professor educated on the subject, and the
boy quite ignorant. The Professor possesses the kind of
knowledge which allows him to predict
,
produce and control
power. Suppose that the Professor knows the laws which
govern electric power, while both he and the boy know how a
shock feels. To know the feel is not knowledge in any
significant sense. The feel gives us the object
_
s known ;
Ibid., p. 166 (Lee. XII, par, 2).
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but it is not knowledge rbout the object,, The boy knows
nothing about the laws of electricity; hence he is rightly
said to be ignorant of this subject. He is ignorant
because, though he has sensible knowledge, he lacks the all
important verbal information.
To emphasize again the importance of experience in
human knowledge 1 would like to point out that the Professor's
verbal knowledge of the laws of electricity, in order to be
intelligible, must certainly be based on experimental data
which can be perceived. His verbal knowledge must have a
basis in sense experience. Nevertheless, without subtracting
from the importance of experimental data, it is clear that the
Professor's verbal knowledge of electric phenomena need not
be based on any observations that he himself has made. He
may take the word of the scientist who has performed the
relevant experiments, that certain laws do indeed obtain, and
his verbal knowledge is thereby not decreased. This
conception, I think, is implicit in Johnson's theory, although
Johnson has not recognized it in the Treatise , Thus, for
instance, the reformulation that I made of (Tij.) , to wit (Tij-a),
-
*"
shows clearly that Johnson would accept the above interpretation
of verbal knowledge. (Tlj.a) tells us that any sight which
seeing has not informed 3 ome on of, is unknown to me. The
See page yL above.
119
theorem implies that if someone has seen some sight, in tl
present case some experiment dealing with electricity— then
this sight can become known to a person who has not himself
seen it, viz., through description; and further, that any
other person may accept this sight as evidence for any
verbal knowledge that he may have.
Perhaps Johnson anticipated some criticism of his neglect
and apparent undervaluation of verbal knowledge for he
occasionally remarks that he wishes not "to depreciate verbal
learning." Although in the following passage he again speaks
of "wasting time" with verbal disquisitions, we recognize here
that he does not thereby depreciate such disquisitions:
The verbal answer is a definition founded on some
theory. I object not to it, and it may be useful; but
I wish to discriminate between the verbal answer and the
sensible, that men may not seem to disagree, where
perhaps they merely misunderstand each other:—that they
may not waste their efforts on verbal disquisitions,
when theypWish to obtain knowledge of the external
universe.
Sy "knowledge of the external universe" Johnson here
means "sensible knowledge." Kence we would indeed waste our
time with words if what we seek is information that can be
given only by our senses. We shall see in Chapter III below
that Johnson's appreciation of verbal learning becomes a great
deal more explicit; and I shall there argue that the expansion
^ "
., p. 1?5 (Lee. XII, par. 19).
2
Ibid., p. 269 (Lee. XXIII, par. 12).
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of his conception of knowledge leads him to recognize the
importance of verbal knowledge and, consequently, to the
favorable estimation of language as a tool in its acquisition.
Such, however, is not the position of the Treatise .
Language cannot provide sensible knowledge, and its capability
to provide verbal knowledge is acknowledged though never
discussed. I come therefore to my last question: What is the
relation of language to knowledge? Is language capable of
adding to our knowledge? Is communication of knowledge
possible?
Language, Communication and the Power of Description
According to John Locke it is possible to define the
names of complex phenomena, but not those of non-complex
basic phenomena:
•
Simple idea3 are only to be got by those impressions
objects themselves make on our minds „ • .For words being
sounds, can produce in us no other simple idea than of
those very sounds.*. he that thinks otherwise, let him
try if any words can give him the taste of a pineapple...
So far as he is told it has a resemblance with any
tastes, whereof he has the ideas already in his memory
...so far may he approach that resemblance in his mind. 1
In respect to what Locke calls "simple ideas" both he
and Johnson are in agreement that to know these it is
imperative that we first have the relevant sense experiences,
that words which are used to name them are only sounds which
"'"John Locke, Ess a Cone emir [ tm '. Unders tandir.-/; , Book III,
Chapter IV, par. 11.
11
cannot produce in us anything but the idea of their own sound,
and that in so far as a perception is analogous to other-
perceptions which a person has experienced, he will have
knowledge of that perception to that degree of analogy. . te
that this last restriction doe3 not make it in principle
impossible to know a simple idea whose impression has never
been experienced, by means of words alone. Locke, as I shall
indicate presently, avails himself of this possibility when he
considers our knowledge of complex ideas. Johnson however
cannot allo;v this for by his (Tii.) it is impossible to know
what we have not experienced. We recognize the possibility of
knowing complex ideas by means of words alone also in Locke's
allowance for
_
wo ways of acquiring knowledge of simple ideas.
Locke tells us that a simple idea may be known either by
ostention, or by giving a synonym of its name:
So to make a countryman understand what "feuillemorte"
colour signifies, it may suffice to tell him it is the
colour of withered leaves falling in autumn. Secondly, but
the only sure way of making known the signification of the
name of any simple idea, is by presenting to his senses
that subject which may produce it in his mind, and make
him actually have the idea that word stands for. 3-
Two seemingly contradictory contentions in these passages
from Locke must be resolved: first we are told that it is in
principle impossible to acquire knowledge of a simple idea
through language alone, and now Locke tells us that such
knowledge acquisition entails only practical difficulties.
Ibid., Book III, Chap. XI, par. II4..
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But there is no contradiction here, for earlier Locke
maintained merely that a sound cannot give us a taste or a
s i p;h
t
; hence a word, being a sound, cannot give us knowledge
of simple ideas. This is essentially the content of Johnson's
analytic (T2) . Locke, however, allows much more: though
ostention is "the only sure way" to gain knowledge of simple
ideas, it is not in principle impossible to call up the
appropriate idea by means of synonyms* Hence we must
distinguish two ways of gaining knowledge by means of
language: (a) from the sound of the words alone; (b) from
the analogy which the words may indicate* No one would disagree
with Johnson that (a) is impossible, and that certain phenomena
can be acquired only by their respective sense organs, in fact,
to assert the impossibility is analytic. But there is room
for disagreement as to whether the definition of the tyoes of
phenomena which led to the analytic (T2) is a comprehensive
one; what is meant by "to be revealed by the senses," and
finally, whether or not language by means of analogy with
ideas already in the listener's mind is not capable after all
of inducing new ideas in .him.
The aforementioned difficulties in Johnson's theory are
particularly conspicuous in his treatment of what Locke calls
"complex ideas." According to Locke it is possible to define,
and hence to know, the content of a complex idea:
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The case is quite otherwise in complex idea.:;
which, consisting of several simple one3, it is in
the power of words standing for the several ideas
that make the composition, to imprint complex ideas
in the mind, which were never there before, and so
make their names be understood.
1
Locke is careful to add that complex ideas can only be
known "provided that none of the terms of the definition
stand for any such simple idea, which he to whom the explica-
tion is made has never yet had in his thought,"^ Given a
person with knowledge of a set of simple ideas, we may induce
in him these ideas, or various combinations of them, without
the requirement that he has had experience of the actual
sensible combinations. Locke gives the folloi^ing example:
Ke that should use the word rainbow to one who
knew all these colours, but yet had never seen that
phenomenon, would, by enumerating the figure, largeness,
position, and order of the colours, so well define that
word, that it might be perfectly understood.
3
Locke again carefully adds that this would not be possible
for a blind man, for example, because "several of the simple
ideas that make that complex one being such as he never received
by sensation and experience, no words are able to excite the .
in his mind ."4
Ibid., Book III, Chapt. IV, par. 11.
2
Ibid ., Book III, Chapt. IV, par. lLj..
3lbid #l Book III, Chapt. IV, par. 13.
^Loc . cit.
-24
Johnson, &3 expected, is in opposition to this view
since according to (Tl) a combination of sights is an
entirely new sight, and hence a sight not seen. And a sight
not seen ia by (?3) unknown; and by (T2) cannot be known
except through the senses. But as I indicated, there exists
an ambiguity in saying that words reveal phenomena: thus if
Johnson means to assert the impossibility of (a), we would
judge him correct because his assertion is analytic; but if
he means to assert the impossibility of (b), then there is
reason to suppose him mistaken. Johnson confuses the two
modes of acquiring sensible knowledge, and the resulting
ambiguity alloi^s him to criticize Locke's example:
When Locke says that the meaning of rainbow c^n be
revealed to a person who never saw one, provided he has
seen red, violet, green, etc, Locke is alluding to the
verbal meaning of rainbow. This meaning can be known to
the blind.
I doubt whether Locke alludes to the verbal meaning which
can be known to the blind, namely, the relatively inconse-
quential knowledge of words as sounds. Surely a person who has
seen the colors which occur in a rainbow knows somewhat more
than a blind man who neither knows the sight rainbow nor the
individual colors which occur in it.
The whole argument here is contingent on what is meant by
a knowledge-state. To call that knowledge which Locke claims
can be induced in a person by an arrangement of ideas which he
Johnson, ?reatise 5 djd. cit., p. 15 2 (Lec.X, par. 13).
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already has, either verbal knowledge or sensible knowledge is
perhaps misleading: the distinction seems to imply a strict
dichotomy between either knowing a sight and having sensible
knowledge, or not knowing a sight and therefore ha\ Li only
verbal knowledge of it, or no knowledge at all. But such a
dichotomy leads to a great deal of difficulty. We saw earlier,
for example, that verbal knowledge had to be split up into
three different types and, moreover, that verbal knowledge, in
order to deserve the appellation "knowledge '" must have a
specific relation to sensible knowledge. In order for words,
which constitute our verbal knowledge, to be ir/celligible , they
must either themselves refer to some sense experience which we
have had, or they must refer to other words, perhaps to their
definitions, which in turn refer to such sensible experience.
Locke's distinction between ideas and impressions suggests
an entirely different view of the matter. Impressions are at
best the causes of knowledge. They are the causes of ideas;
and ideas as well as "their agreement or disagreement", as
Locke puts it, constitute our knowledge. Impressions themselves
are not knowledge. Only remembered impressions, or ideas,
constitute knowledge. This theory of knowledge, in turn,
suggests that there are degrees of knowledge ranging from the
knowledge of a blind man to that of a person who saw a rainbow
a moment ago. The knowledge of the blind man is indeed purely
verbal. To him the name "rainbow" ; as well as the names of the
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colors which constitute it, can refer to no ideas because he
cannot have had the relevant sights, A man who has just seen
a rainbow will, on the other hand, have a high degree of
sensible knowledge in that the idea which is caused by the
rainbow impression is still fresh in his mind. Between these
two individuals there may exist a wide variety of knowledge
states. There may be individuals, for example, who once saw
a rainbow, but whose idea has meanwhile grown rather vague
There will also be individuals who have never seen anything
but the colors Lhat constitute a rainbow. Others, again, who
have seen nothing but pictures of rainbows. Their knowledge
may be called verbal if this appellation is insisted upon;
but I think that it is pretty clear that verbal knowledge
in their case differs a great deal from the verbal knowledge
possessed by a blind man as well as from the sensible knowledge
of a man who saw a rainbow once long ago, but whose mental
image of this sight has meanwhile grown very dim.
Let us pursue Johnson's rainbow-argument somewhat further
to determine how he counters the above contentions:
But admit that a person who has never seen a
rainbow shall still have seen all its colours. Admit
further, that when you enumerate the colours, he shall
guess the precise red ? orange, yellow, etc., to which
you refer; yet, for the person to know how the colours
will look when they are combined, will be impossible;
much less-, how they will appear when drawn into the
shape, size, and position of a rainbow. If he has seen
such a combination, he has seen a rainbow; but if he
12?
has not seen the combination, la: 3 la inadequate
to reveal it.l
There are three parts to this argument: (1) Accord:
to (Tl) a combination of sights is again a sight, (2) 3y
(TI4.) a sight which we have not seen is unknown to us. (3) By
(P2) language is not capable of revealing any sight. I observed
earlier that (Tl) is not necessarily analytic: there are no
definitions in the Treatise which tell us what constitutes -
new sight. Hence I think that (Tl) is open to question unless
it makes the following trivial assertion: any sight whatever
is a new sight. Thus, for example, when we see a rainbow at
time t-]_ and when we look again in the direction of that first
sight at time t~ and see a rainbow a second time, then according
to (Tl), the rainbow sight at time t is a new sight. Unless
(Tl) makes such an assertion, or is based on this supposition,
I think that it is merely a statement concerning cur powers of
imagination: some individuals cannot imagine the result of
combining two sights, but others can, Johnson, however, claims:
Brilliance of imagination, and acuteness of
intellect, cannot pass the barriers erected by nature.
The most practiced musician can, no more than the most
unskilful, know the sound which will be produced by a
new combination of familiar notes,
2
But is there not a difference in novelty between a new
combination of notes the constituents of which a musician has
never heard, and anew combination of notes the constituents
Loc . cit.
Ibid., p. H4.8 (Loc. X, par. 8).
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of which he has heard? Is not the former new in the sense
of never having been experienced, and the latter new in the
sense of being a different combination of what has boon
experienced? It is clear that Johnson's (Tli) applies in
the former case. A new combination of notes in that sense
,
or a new combination of colors, is a "sight" or "sound" never
experienced and hence unknown. But I do not believe that (TI4.)
applies in the case where what has not been seen is merely a
different arrangement of what has been seen,
A very interesting result, furthermore, is obtained when
we attempt to incorporate the assertion of (Tl) into Locke's
distinction between ideas and impressions. Why should we not
be able to say of ideas what is said of impressions? Why not
say that a new combination of ideas is again an idea much as
a new combination of impressions is again an impression? If
this extention of (TI) is possible then I think it is rather
obvious that we can know a rainbow when a verbal description
causes us to rearrange our ideas of colors, etc.
And therefore Johnson's (P2) is in need of qualification
a3 well. In certain special situations it is i ndeed possible
to reveal "new" sights by means of language alone in the
manner correctly described by John Locke. In this way the
importance of language as a tool in the acquisition of
knowledge may be preserved and communication of knowledge
from one individual -go another via language made possible.
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Curiously enough, this Is precisely what Johnson, In
spite or his initial efforts in the Tw. -.-,:" se , ends up
contending. The contention, moreover, is by no means
precluded by the theory of the early period in Johnson's
philosophical development* Various theorems can be reinter-
preted; a scrutiny of verbal knowledge reveals the possibility
of expanding this concept especially since it is clear that in
order for verbal knowledge to be intelligible it must have
definite connections with sense experience; and Johnson's
own suspicion that verbal knowledge is significant, as
indicated in hi3 occasional concern not to be though of as
depreciating the latter, evinces a discontent with the
precocious theory of the Treatise c A partial revision and
supplementation of the latter in Johnson's later work comes
therefore as no surprise. Let us then turn to the developments
in Johnson's The Meaning ' ords«
CHAPTER III
MENTAL ORGANIZATION, INTELLECTIONS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF VERBAL KNOWLEDGE
More than twenty years after the publication of his first
treatise on language, Th_ of Human Kr tile ^e, A. B,
Johnson, undaunted by his disappointment over the unfavorable
reception of his early theories, produced a third book1 in
which he reconsidered the subject, partially in the light of
adverse criticisms from theological quarters * 1!he early books,
though they left room for development and anticipated much that
is to be found in later writings, had elaborated an extraordi-
narly narrow conception of knowledge, a depreciation of the
significance of language and the consequent futility of
ordinary communication j bout the world, and above all, what
must have appeared to Johnson's antagonists as an irreligiously
severe restriction of the meaning of words. Theological
discourse, for example, had only verbal meaning; and verbal
meaning, especially when prefixed with the derisive terms "only,"
or "merely," was erroneously interpreted as indicative of
The present discussion is almost entirely devoted to
Johnson's semantics as presented in The ling of Words?
Analysed Into Words and Unverbal Things , nd Unverbal Things
Classified Into Intellections 3 Sensations , and Emotions^ ("New
York: D. Appleton & Co., 1562).
No modern edition of this work is available. Thus its
contributions tend to be overlooked, especially since the
original edition is difficult to obtain. But the doctrines
contained in it are sufficiently divergent from Johnson's
earlier work that it is imperative to include it in any
comprehensive evaluation of Johnson's views on language.
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meaninglessnoss • This, however, was a misunder:. -ng, and
Johnson was solicitous to rectify it not only in the third
bock, but in writings specifically devoted to theological
disquisition.
1
The third work, according to David Rynin, is "a restate-
ment in different form of some of the central ideas of
_/Johnson's7 earlier books, with one significant change. "^ The
significant change to which Rynin alludes is Johnson's notion
of an intellection* Though this notion is new it should not
be regarded as an alteration but rather as an extension of
the earlier semantics. Moreover, it is not the only extension
discoverable: the third xvork is much more than a restatement of
old ideas, albeit in different form. It is an attempt to
present language as propitious to human affairs—a fact never
explicitly denied, yet hardly ever acknowledged in the Treatise «
Language, in The Meaning vdr. , is granted the significance
suspected earlier, and is absolved from the errors in knowledge
claims originally attributed to its alleged defects. My
discussion of language defects3 indicated that language could
not properly be said to have defects at all, but at best to
contain certain irremediable limitations. This view is indeed
Johnson, ?. ;':.i r ion in Ita t i
o
i )_ zr_ "'-/ . . -.- :,
r
Life ,
(New York: Harper & Bro3., !8ZpD .
2
David Rynin, "Introduction, " o|>. cit ., (19i;7)> p. 9.
^Seo Chapter II, -£>c above.
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the one accepted by Johnson who carries it much further* as
I shall show presently. Johnson discovers that the limita-
tions of language are caused by human mental organization in
which the conditions for the construction of any language
inhere.
Intellections, finally, provide an extension of sensible
meaning such that words which at one time were only verbally
meaningful can now be said to have sensible meaning as well.
Accordingly, verbal knowledge has some of the significance
which was once enjoyed only by sensible knowledge. The
phenomenological nominalism of the earlier theory is modified
considerably, and the ontological investigation of the universe
is augmented by an investigation of human mental organization.
The human mind is categorized in a manner reminiscent of
Immanuel Kant J s, and its organization is found to be responsible
for what we can know, how we know, and for the errors we commit
when we conceive the nature of the universe. To an elaboration
of these points I shall turn presently.
Of interest also is the change in attitude with which
Johnson presents his material in The Meaning rds . Tho
tenets of the Treatise were introduced somewhat dogmatically,
and they were generally accompanied by the suggestion to go
and see for yourself and discover that experience substantiates
all claims there made. This "go-and-see-for-yourself "' attitude
is entirely relinquished, and instead we find the frequent
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admission that, though intuitively compelling, the theorl a
are after all only theories, based on assumptions somewhat
confirmed by experience, yet by no means irrefragible.
Johnson remarks that a work on language titled
was published in London by Sir Graves Chamney Haughton some-
time after Johnson's first two works were produced, and it
treated of language in a manner similar to those works:
Like my above named two publications, it d
intellectually conceived words as nothiv : words,
and deemed the ultimate significations of all words to
bo only sensible perceptions and internal feelings. I
suppose such a limitation precedes the fuller conception
of language contained in the present publication; our.
knowledge being naturally cumulative and progressive.
The publication on the same subject by a different author
is perhaps one motivation which compelled Johnson to pursue his
investigations of language and to develop his earlier semantics
into a "fuller conception." But the motive by far more
compelling was probably Johnson's desire to appease his critics.
He observes slyly:
I, at one period, supposed /that conceptions/ possess
no ulterior meaning, and that ail abstract speculations
are mere words... I should probably have continued in this
short-sighted belief, had I not found that a vast amou]
of human learning, including all natural theology, is
involved in the issue; and perhaps all revealed theology.
And he continues
:
Indeed, all the fundamental tenets of theology, with an
afterlife retribution of bliss or woe, ha> . . conceiv d
...by all men in all ages; so that to doubt whether such
conceptions belong to the human intellect is as irrational,
as to doubt whether walking, s-^ing, u asking, fueling, hope,
Johnson, The Meaning ' : - stc
.
, o. c i
t
. , p. 8
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fear, and hunger, belong to our sensible and moral
nature .1
Thus through Johnson's own conviction that his early
work on language remains incomplete --a conviction which is
probably less due to his concern with theology than to his
continued investigation of the language habits of m.Qn 9
especially the tendency of deaf mutes to possess verbal
conceptions without possessing words; and by means of the
ad oor>ulum justification of theology that propositions which
originally were thought to have only emotive meaning have
sensible meaning a3 well because Ifall men in ail ages" tend
to conceive then in a sensible manner, the need for a
re-appraisal of verbal knowledge, and hence of language, the
vehicle of all knowledge, is established. This re-appraisal,
presented in Johnson's The Meaning of Words , must now be
examined in detail,,
Much of what Johnson says in the Treatise concerning
the classification of the universe, words, and the relation
between words and objects, is reiterated in this later
work. I shall therefore mention this material briefly in
order to indicate differences in doctrine as well as
terminology, and 1 shall dwell primarily on the important
developments mentioned above c
To begin with, Johnson again distinguishes between signs
and objects signified, but he adopts a new terminology: the
1
Ibid., p. 200.
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signs of objects, or words, aro verbal entities; objects
signified are unverbal entities w Words function as signs
of objects; and the objects signified by any word constitute
the meaning of that word. Meanings are therefore divisible
into verbal and unverbal types as well: when a word signifies
other words, or phenomena of the objective universe, or
non-sensible objects, the meaning of that word is verbal.
But when either external phenomena, internal phenomena or the
new class of entities which Johnson calls "intellections, 1 ' are
signified, the meaning of the word which signifies them is
unverbal
The classification of objects as "unverbal" is much
broader than the analogous classification in the Treatise
.
Originally what was not verbal was said to be sensible. In
the present theor?/, however, the class of sensible objects is
only a sub-class of the class of unverbal objects. Unverbal
objects are divisible into three types: sensible, moral and
intellectual.! To each of these types corresponds a "perceiv-
ing organism" in virtue of which different types of unverbal
objects are discriminable. Sensible objects are apprehended
by the five senses; moral objects by the internal consciousness;
and intellectual objects by the intellect. Of these class
Johnson tells U3
:
I mean not to characterize any one of the three
classes as more or less important than any other, my
Ibid . f p. 20. rS.\o terms "moral," "emotional" and "internal"
are uuud synonymously to characterize our feelings.
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design extending no further than to so analyze our
knowledge that we may discriminate words from
unverbal things; and the unverbai things of one of
the three classes from any other. ..-
Such discrimination is particularly important because
the various organisms are specifically different from each
other, and each of them yields objects which are generically
different
:
I postulate that our sensible organs, our intel-
lectual organism, and our internal feelings, yield
respectively knowledge that is different, each of t
.
three sets yielding knowledge that is sui generis # ^
I assume, however, much more, namely, that the
unverbal things of each class are essentially different
and are inconvertible into each other; and I am anxious
that these tenets shall be perceived clearly; because,
if I am incorrect in them, my entire classific super-
structure is fallacious and worthless *3
The theorems governing various classes of objects,
enumerated and explained earlier, continue to apply in
Johnson's expanded theory. It should be clear, moreover,
that no matter how many perceiving organisms or how many
classes of perceivable objects are distinguished, Johnson's
epistemology will remain unaffected. It might 6e said, for
example, that the sense of touch is actually a complex of
various senses, e.g., sense of pressure, sense of temperature,
sense of pain, etc., and that the term "feel" actually covers
Ibid* > ?. clo .
2_ipid.
, p. j,0.
3Loc . cit.
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a variety of types which, if such accuracy were necessary,
could be distinguished from each other. Nevertheless, a:
of the theorems will again apply when such distinctions are
made. Thus (T2) will correctly state that the sense of
pressure and only the sense of pressure can apprehend
pressures and nothing but pressures. And (Tl) would
correctly state that two pressures felt simultaneously will
constitute a third pressure. Similarly, all previously
stated theorems ought to be true when applied to intellections
and their preceiving organism, the intellect. It should be
true, for instance, that only the intellect perceives intel-
lections, and nothing but intellections,
3efore attempting to identify the nature of intellections
it might be helpful first to determine what intellections are
not. Intellections are perceivable objects; but they cannot
words since they were said to be unverbal, nor can they be
either sensible phenomena or internal feelings because they
were distinguished from the latter and, moreover, are
apprehended by a totally different organism. The intellect
cannot perform the function of either of the five senses or
of the internal consciousness because it is specifically
different from these. It would be natural to suppose that
intellections are thoughts because the intellect is a
Since intellection r ) prob priva - I . .na acces-
sible only to the individual who apprehends them, it is more
accurate to say here that intellections are govern r the
revised theorems (Z£: p. i\~> above) which govern feelings.
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thinking organism through which we obtain ideas and which
has the facilities to maintain, aggregate and collect ideas.
But intellections cannot be thoughts because as we saw
earlier-*- thoughts are either sights, feels, tastes, etc.,
or words. But intellections, according to the distinction,
are neither words norsensible phenomena. Thu3 either
intellections are not thoughts, or thoughts are different
from other types of phenomena, that is, a visual thought is
different from a sight, a verbal thought is different fro...
words, etc.
Finally, it is probable that Johnson's notion of an
intellection corresponds to what Locke had in mind when he
spoke of "ideas." This . however , must remain mere conjecture
since Johnson nowhere adeouately analyzes the notion of an
idea, nor makes the distinction between ideas and impressions.
What then is an intellection? Johnson provides a rule
to help discover when a word names such an entity:
A third class of unverbal things I shall designate
as intellectual. Every known thing is intellectual that
is not comprehended by one of the above classes
sensations and internal feelingly. By this comprehensive
rule, we never need suffer any hesitation as to whether
any word names an intellection or not. If the meaning
of the word is not something that can be perceived
unverbally by some one or more of our senses, the
unverbal meaning is intellectual, unless it be emotional.
^
See page I4.7 above.
2
Ibid.
, p. 21.
1;
This rule, however, is far too comprehensive, for thou
it allows us to discriminate between intellections and other
unverbal objects, it fails to ir. . - how we are to dis ish
between intellections and words. Consider, for- instance, the
following illustration in which Johnson applies hi^ rule I
Take, for instance, the word physical, if I ample
it without any reference to some thing that some one of
my sense can perceive unverbally—the only meaning of the
word is intellectual. x
In the Treatise such a word would have been said to
have verbal meaning if it did not refer to anything that our
senses could discover. Now, however, its meaning is said to
be intellectual, that is, that there does after all exist
some unverbal object which is named by the word "physical,"
even though nothing unverbal exists that can be apprehended
either by our senses or by our internal consciousness. Thus
it appears that words for which Johnson found no unverbal
meaning in the Treatise are now capable of having such
meaning. Consider another instance:
...the intellect, however, can and will continue
the division ; erbally , and finds that matter is divisible
ad infinitum; and so certain is the div: lal process
that it is capable of mathematical demonstration* Now I
insist, that when the division ceases from being sensible,
it becomes only intellectual. The two 'divisions' are
verbally homogeneous, bu\; they are unverbally different;
one being a sensible r; -rception and the other an intel-
lectual conception.
2
I. oc . ci t
.
2 id
. , p. 31.
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In the Treatise j however, we are told that
We may employ the proposition of Mr. Reid to
prove that an atom is divisible in infinitum, since
every division still leaves a body which is composed
of parts; but our language loses its significancy in
the process, and the parts which we are dividing
become sounds signifying nothing X
Of course the sounds did signify something even then,
namely other words, and hence in the Treatise the word
"divisible" at this point would have been judged verbally
meaningful. Now, however, the word signifies an intellection,
in fact, an intellectual conception, and it is thereby not
verbally but unverbally meaningful. The account of the
Treatise continues to be correct insofar as the word "divisible"
has no sensible meaning; but it is no longer correct in attrib-
uting verbal meaning to it. Sensible meaning is a sub-class
of unverbal meaning, and all classes of unverbal meanings
were said by Johnson to be of equal importance. Kence when
the word "divisible" is said to have unverbal meaning, it
acquires a significance which it did not previously enjoy.
Though it does not have sensible meaning, its meaning is at
least part of a class of meanings to which sensible meaning
belongs, but to which verbal meanings do not belong. A word
which has unverbal meaning has thus the status, the significance
and the importance that was attributed in the Treatise primarily,
if not exclusively, to words which had sensible meaning. But
Johnson, Treatise , o. t., p. 21? (Lee. XVI, par. II}.) .
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tho salient difference between the earlier* and the later
theories is the difference in tho terms "u.
"sensible." The former includes the latter, but it incluc
much more. It includes intellectual meanings which by
definition are objects perceivable through the intellect
alone. The next problem, then, is to determine what these
intellectual objects are.
In the course of The : : - " ' °- T--'Q?ds three types of
intellectual "objects" are discriminable
:
(1) Some intellections are no different than Johnson's
notion of a thought.
(2) Most intellections consist of certain intellectual
tendencies which are analogous, perhaps, to emotional
tendencies
.
(3) The third type of intellection is not different from
Locke's notion of an idea. I shall call this type of
intellection a "concept."
(1) One of the clearest examples of an intellection
occurs in the following passage
:
When Hamlet says, he sees his father 'in his mind f s
eye, 1 his words refer to an intellectual cor.. ion that
is entirely distinct from the words which he utters. V/e
can see the moon, also, unverbally, in our mind's eye,
and the moon thus seen intellectually is easily discri.
nable from the word moon, or from the sensibly perceived
moon ^
Later, when Johnson remarks that Hamlet's mental vision
causes him to "instinctively stare," the subject matter of
which he happens to be speal he nature of thoughts.
Thus it does indeed appear that thoughts, of which there are
•h'bid
., p. 22.
Hj.2
six classes (viz., verbal thoughts, sights, feels, tastes,
sounds, and smells) constitute one type of intellection.
It is also clear which of the alternatives mentioned
previously Johnson must embrace: in order to continue
distinguishing intellections from perceptions it becomes
necessary to distinguish thoughts from perceptions. Thus a
visual thought is different from the corresponding sight;
as Johnson indicates above, the visual thought of the moon,
for instance, is discriminable from the perceived moon.
(2) The second type of intellection presents the most
difficulty. Johnson tells us that
...all intellections are not, so easily as /the
first type/ discriminable from words; for instance,
the conception that the sun 'required a creator
before it could exists -
When we speak of the creator of ships, Johnson continues,
our ivords refer to sensible experience. But when we predicate
a creator of the sun it is clearly impossible that cur words
refer to a sensible experience which is analogous to the above.
What then is the significance of these words as applied to the
sun? In the Treat is
|
Johnson would have judged these words as
having verbal meaning only^ and according to my earlier analysis
of verbal meaning, such words would have been attributed the
type of verbal meaning that results when a word refers to
Loc . cit.
non-sensible entities. Johnson, however, prefers a new
interpretation of such words. He explains that
At one period of ray life, I believed that wor .
thus conceived by the intellect, of the sun,
totally insignificant unver y, except as they
refer to our sensible experience with ships and
othefc analogous creations of raan g ^
After the writing of the Trc . . however, Johnson
continued his investigation of 1. - go anc- the language
habits of men. He discoverer that deaf mutes exhibit a know-
ledge of intellectual conceptions such as the "creator of the
sun," without possessing a language. Thus their conceptions,
according to Johnson, could not possibly be verbal:
I found, however, that a deaf mute manifest*?, by
his conduct, a knowledge of some intellectual concept-
ions that are as seemingly verbal only as the concept-
ion of a creator in relation to the sun; for instance,
he will prefer the whole of any desirable thing rath r
than a part, though he cannot know verbally 'that the
whole is greater than a part. 1 ^
Johnson's "discovery" here exhibits a good deal of verbal
knowledge since, by his own a ssion, he has "never been in
a position to observe mutes," and he is therefore speaking
"from only conjecture . "3 From this conjecture, together with
the
_
populum premise "that men in all ages of the world,
and in all places, have, without any possible conventionality,
conceived intellectually that the sun required a creator, "4
Ibid
., p. 23.
2
Ice . cit <
•*Ibid
. , p . 25
.
^Ibid., p. 23.
Johnson draws the conclusion that there must exist sc
other than mere words which are the objects of intellects
knowledge and which are the meanings of words such as "the
creatoi"1 of the sun,"
Why does Johnson need such an argument to establish the
existence of one type of intellectual object? No such
argument i^as necessary to establish that thoughts are a type
of intellection because even in the Treatise provision was
made for such a possibility when Johnson introduced the notion
of a thought. It is clear, however, that words such as
"infinite divisibility," "creator of the sun," "unity,"
"gravity," "magnetism," etc., do not signify thoughts such as
Johnson describes. The entities which these words name, if
they name anything at all, must be different from visual
thoughts, verbal thoughts, etc. We do not see gravity in
our mind's eye^ nor do we hear it in our mind's ear, etc.
Again'^ infinite divisibility does not bear the same relation
to sensible divisibility that the though of the moon bear-
to the perception of the moon. Yet something other than
words, in spite of the dogma of the Treatise , must be meant
by words such as the above. That is, these words must have
an unverbal meaning. Why must they have such a meaning? Is it
because the theologian says they must; and because the physicist
and other speculative writers are dissatisfied with the analysis
expounded in the Treatise ? Though these critics may have
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influenced Johnson, I think that Johnson 1 :, own dissatisfac-
tion with the results of the T :' ... in respec't to verbal
meaning and verbal knowledge is the primary factor here. It
is my contention that Johnson developed an understanding
appreciation of what he originally called "verbal knowledge"
such that it became necessary to reinstate verbal knowledge,
and thereby language, in a position of prominence alongside
the all important sensible knoi ; e. This, however, was
difficult, especially since the Treatise had dogmatically
ruled out the existence of anything but . ords, internal and
external phenomena. A provision had been made for a border-
line object called "thought," but for the sake of consistency
these special objects were identified with external na.
It was easy to develop the notion of a thought into one type of
intellection. But this type alone did not solve the problem
entirely because many words named no objects that were obviously
thoughts. Thus it became necessary to introduce yet another
class of intellections by a tour de force, in fact, by the
spurious argument involving deaf mutes and the tendencies of
men in general. The fact that this argument is invalid need
not detract from Johnson's analysis of intellections «, Indeed,
the argument is immaterial for It would not have been necessary
had Johnson developed his notion of a "thought" so that it
covered ideas in Locke's sense, 2^ well as perceptions.
llj.6
In an attempt to determine the exact nature of th:
second clas3 of intellections Johnson is impeded by the value
judgement implicit in the terminology '"verbal" and "sensible."
Though he has come to recognize that what was once called
verbal knowledge is of great significance, he does not
recognize that he is interpreting nature by language when he
concludes that what was called verbal knowledge was not
correctly so classified. But such knowledge is not sensible
knowledge either. To cope with the difficulty Johnson proceeds
in the following manner. lie introduces the term "unverbal" to
include both the important sensible knowledge and also that
type of knowledge which is neither verbal nor sensible.
Secondly, he attempts to locate the objects of intellectual
knowledge in the tendencies of the intellect ^ thus providing
a sensible basis for them., or at least, a basis very much
analogous to that of words which name internal feelings. Our
emotional organism has certain tendencies, and these underly
the meaning of words which name internal feelings. Thus
Johnson explains:
All intellectually conceived words, whether relating
to sacred subjects or profane, must alike find their
ultimate unverbal meaning in the organism of the intellect. x
! The kingdom of C-od 1 are words, but the words are
also signs of an unverbal impulse or tendency in the
organism of our intellect; as, therefore, the internal
organic feeling which prompts an imprecation, is
unverbal meaning of the imprecation; so the organis]
of the intellect that conceives any given words is the
unverbal meaning of the verbal conception*-
""ibid
.
, p • 206 .
2
Ibid
., p. 202.
"-V7
iat is of importance is -co
discriminate intellectually conceived wore
the organic unverbal impulse frc .ch the concei
words proceed; and to show that intellectually con 3 oc
words possess an unverbal meaning in the organism of the
intellect «,-
There is something odd about this ex ;ion. For or
thing the relation of meaning involves three ;s apart
from person: it involves words which name llections,
intellections and organic tendencies of the intellect which have
given meaning to intellections* Thus intellections are said
to have a meaning. 3ut originally only words were entities
capable of having meanings; hence, intellections which have a
meaning must themselves be words , Johnson supports this view
when he says
:
Intellectual conceptions are discriminable
more difficulty Jtvam vtordjf/
,
because a large number
of them consist of words; but an unverbal meaning
underlies and is the ultimate signification of the
conceived words «,
2
(3) 1'^e third type of intellection I shall call a
"concept." I shall distinguish concepts from the second type
of intellections in the following manner: when a word names no
object that is discoverable by either cur internal consciousness
or by our external sense organs, the word means an intellection
of the second type, viz., an organic tendency, unless its
meaning is verbal. If, on the other hand, a word names a
1Ibid., p. 25.
2Ibid., p. 27.
U+8
^roup of words which are themselves meaningful since they
are based on organic tendencies, I shall call that grot i
of words, or rather, what that group of words expresses, a
"concept.
"
The term "verbal" was occasionally used by Johnson to
evaluate our knowledge: what was called "verbal knowledge"
was not real or proper knowledge, unlike sensible knowledge
as he conceived it, The consequence of this was that much
and perhaps most of our knowledge was undervalued, at least
by those who refused to equate "verbal"' with intellectual
meanings, and read the former a3 a dyslogistic epithet. This
consequence, however, was as odious to Johnson as it is to
anyone who recognizes that verbal knowledge is primarily
what our knowledge consists of. Johnson, therefore, felt
it necessary to vindicate the significance of such knowledge;
but the only way he thought he could achieve this, having
committed himself to the terminology "verbal" and "sensible,"
was to find some sort of unverbal knowledge a"u the basis of
what formerly passed as verbal knowledge* Thus he not only
postulated thoughts as intellections, but conceptions as
unverbal entities. Yet conceptions are words only, no matter
how hard we attempt to find their meanings in cryptic unverbal
intellectual impulses. We possess much important verbal
knowledge, but we must, if we are committed to the above
terminology, show that it has an unverbal basis in order to
secure Its importance. This is, in effect, what J son fc
attempted with the introduction of the second and third class
of intellections. Thus he writes in defence of hie ... led
theory
:
If this doctrine be not true, we convert into
mere words all knowledge that is not sensible or
emotional; that is, * awledge that can be
manifested in words only*l
Such a consequence did not upset Johnson at one time wl
he was perfectly willing to relegate much knowledge to the
domain of mere words. But, as he recognizes, cur knowled ;e
"is naturally cumulative and progressive," and thus our
theories must be expanded to account for additional facts,,
After Johnson realized that knowledge had to be re-appraised,
it became necessary to take another lock at Ian ., as well.
Perhaps Johnson* s major discovery in respect to language
is the fact that something mere basic than language must be
investigated in order to explain the limitations of linguistic
discourse and the errors which result when linguistic
principles are ignored. Consider, for example, the problem
of ascribing unities to physical objects indiscriminately,
Johnson's theory in respect to units has undergone some
modification for he now holds tha
co •the name of every physical thing Implies a
oneness which is only intellectual; end that we
mistake the nominal oneness for a £ ble or pi y
oneness, we are deluding our 1 Lth an i r mi-
nation as bewildering u~ it es fallacious. These
*-Loc. cit.
i5o
remarks are applicable to all names of physical
things, from the universe, which is the most
comprehensive of nominal units, to a shadow, that
is as much a unit physically as it is intellectually
and nominally,
1
Every thing is a unit nominally insofar as there exists a
single word which names it. A few objects are
__
;
uni'Gc ;
e.g., a shadow, light, an echo. All other objects , whether
collections of experimental data such as that relating to
gravity, or aggregations of basic particulars s whether
intra-sensual or inter~sensual 3 are now all to be regarded as
intellectual units. Thus,
. .
..what the unit matter itself is, remains, like
man's oneness, among the unsolvable mysteries of life
Why? Because, in neither case can our senses discover
any such unit. Of course thev cannot, for it is not
sensible, but only eonceived <2
Again,
A city_j for instance , composed of a hundr
inhabitants, and ten thousand houses, is as much
a nominal unit as a shadowy but if we seek the
city 5 deeming it some sensible unit that conforms
in oneness to the city's oneness which is intellectual,
we may deem the ill success of our fallacious sensible
search a great mystery
.3
Finally., a globe which is an inter-sensual complex
particular consisting of a sight and a feel, or an orange
which is an inter-sensual complex particular having four
1Ib
L
id., p. 32.
2Ibid., p. 80.
3lbid
., p. 79.
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sensible constituents, have no sensible unity: their unity
is again only intellec bual,
Johnson's determination to find the unity of complexi i
in intellections is consistent with his earlier theory. The
unity of complex particulars, such as an or , was . rl:
acknowledged but left unspecified. We said that a complex
particular was one thing in the sense of being one bundle of
different phenomena, distinct from other such bundles. But
we did not specify how such a distinction between bundles ;
.
to be made. V.re new say, with Johnson, that the oneness is
intellectual and that the discrimination is performed by the
intellect.
The sensible unity of abstract objects such as gravity,
(or "matter" in the above quotation), was denied in the
Treatise , Such "objects" were actually nothing but collections
of experimental data, and any unity ascribed to them was said
p
to be verbal only. But that gravity as a unit was verba..
did not imply that such a unit is non-existent, but only that
it is non-sensible. In the present theory units such as
gravity are said to be intellectual and thus they gain in
importance since they are now at least unverbal though indeed
not sensible. In defence of this decision Johnsc. ^:
If the oneness of the two globes ^he feel and the
sight/ is simply a contrivance of language, as I had
*See ;e i|2 above,
2See page 52 above.
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supposed of tho orange, all languages would not
concur, as they do, in calling the sight globe
and the feel globe one thing.
And furthermore,
...if the oneness were only verbal, as I had first
supposed it was, an uneducated deaf mute would not deem
as one thing, the sight globe and the feel globe; but hie
intellect conceives the two to be a unit, as completely,
no doubt, as ours.
Hence Johnson concludes:
The organic tendency of the intellect to thus
aggregate sensible multiplicity into intellectual units
is, as I ultimately discovered, one of the essential
foundations of language .. . J-
When Johnson discusses the identity problem he again
discovers that something more basic than language is
responsible for errors which no commit in speculations and
everyday discourse. Ke questions how we come to apply the
same name to diverse objects, and he judges tha -: "A reason
for the designation must have preceded the designation, "*-
because in all languages names are applied to many unverbally
different objects. Hence their use cannot be purely conven-
tional, purely arbitrary, as he at one time supposed. Usage
is governed by the tendencies of cur intellect: "We apply a/7
word whenever our intellect discovers that the name is
appropriate
.
u3 This tendency of the intellect, moreover, is
of great benefit, whereas the same tendency when earlier
Cv> . clt .
2Ibid
., p. 109,
3Ibid., p. 138.
153
ascribed to language was found to be a grave defect:
One of most beneficial srs of the . ct
is the countless multitude of unverbal . hat it
organically assimilates, thus enablin, to dei ate
all of them by a singl 3rd. ..and
capacity in this particular, is one of the c .rti-
culars in which he is intellectually . to other
beings ,*
Thus to the conclusions concerning the def of Ian
that wore reached in my sacond chapter, namely that lar. •
has no defects but only inescapable limitations, and that for
this reason it is not they but only our own unawareness of them
that is a misfortune, it should now be added that such
limitations are not directly caused by the construction of
language, but merely come to light when we employ language.
In other words, the limitations of language are intrinsic
limitations in our mental organization which causes us to
employ language in specific ways. Finally, the limitatioi s
are "attended with compensatory benefits."^ "Indiscrimination, 1
for instance, "is not an unmitigated evil; indeed we can find
that it is attended with utilities which more than compensate
for its evils. "3 "Without this organic intellectual
identification of unverbal similarities or analogies," for
example, "we could possess no such general words as wisdom.
Ibid
., p. 139.
2Ihid
., p. 347,.
3lbid., p. 69.
., p. 117.
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And without general words, identification and analogy , we
could not organize our knowledge of the universe, and we
could not communicate it. When objects were brought to Adam
so that he might name them, he was favored by an intellectual
organization which helped him group things under the
"his intellect deeming identical innumerable things, notwith-
standing their sensible diversities." And Johnson exclaims:
We cannot, however, admire too much the exceed:
simplicity and efficiency of the organic intellectual
contrivance , by which the innumerable host of unverbal
things were thus comprehensible by a number of words not
too large for our memory; and men were enabled to talk
understandingly to their fellow men, though the
interlocutors may never have seen the same horses, the
same lions, the same trees, etc. We honour men too much
when we deem language a human contrivance .. .-^
A number of objects, namely intellectual conceptions,
could not be brought to Adam in any convenient manner so that
he might name them. Here, another contrivance of his intellect
solved the problem:
...the intellect was organized to conceive its
notions in words that possess a sensible signification,
and to recognize in the conceived words the intellectual
notion to which the words refer.
2
When we form words to name intellectual entities we find
that such words "proceed from attempts of the intellect to
assimilate conceptions to physical operations. J We note
"
"bid
. , p . 11^8
.
Ibid
. , p. II4.9.
3Ibid
., p. 59.
that electricity "moves" or "flows" from one end of a v;ire
to the other. We employ the word "flow" because we perceive
an analogy between the movement of electricity through a wire
and the movement of water through a pipe. Again, when naming
the process by which the living pass into a state of "inert
matter that will speedily decompose and corrupt—the intellect
will assimilate the change to some sensible processes that the
intellect conceives to be analogous." Thus we describe death
in such terms as: "the vital spark is fled," "the soul is
departed from the body," "G-od has withdrawn His Sustaining
hand," etc.
Analogies are a benefit which wo drive from the tendencies
of our intellect; but if the analogy is taken for more than an
analogy, we become involved in spurious speculations. To
suppose that electricity actually flows in the manner in which
water flows though a pipe, and to postulate entities which
electricity must therefore contain in order to flo;%T
,
in short,
to deduce from the analogy fantastic conclusions about the
nature of electricity, is to misuse language, and to fail to
gain its intellectual advantages.
1
Ibid., p. 60
CONCLUSION
The empirical epistemology explained and systematized
in Chapter I is relatively simple, but consistent and
sufficient to yield the major tenets which underlie Johnson's
intellectual revolution. These tenets are the following:
(1) Language as a tool in the pursuit of knowledge is
ineffectual. (2) Knowledge gained through words, or verbal
knowledge, is chimerical and worthless. (3) lnhe only proper
kind of knowledge is that which is based on sense experience,
or sensible knowledge. (l\.) The correct avenue to real
knowledge is through the senses. Thus Johnson's revolution
consists in a reversal of present methods of appraising
reality and of employing language: sensible knowledge, not
verbal knowledge, is to be cultivated as real knowledge of
the universe j not language, but our senses are to support us
in our quest for real learning.
The intellectual revolution is of great value especially
in that it provides for the extinction of unlimited speculation
as well as the resolution of many long-standing philosophical
disputes. But this is not its only effect. The depreciation
of verbal knowledge and language which Johnson's early tenets
imply, involves the rejection not only of theology and
theoretical physics, but of most human learning, including
Johnson's very own writings. The latter are an attempt to
communicate and describe the nature of language and its
relation to the universe in spite of the fact that this very
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description renders ja priori impossible both description and
communication. The consequence of this paradox is a struggle
between conflicting ideas which begins in the treatise ana
becomes increasingly apparent in later writings. The
analysis of this struggle presented in Chapters I and II
leads to the following major conclusions. (1) Language,
which has no inherent defects but contains certain unavoidable
limitations, is of benefit to human affairs. However, it is
frequently misused both by its consumers and its producers who
employ it in violation of its limits. (2) Verbal knowledge
must be recognized as important especially since it has
connections with sense experience. Hence the distinction
between verbal and sensible knowledge cannot be taken as a
strict dichotomy. (3) Johnson's persistence in employing
this terminology forces him, in effect, to interpret nature
by language, that is, to commit the very fallacy which he had
labored to eliminate. This shortcoming is partially responsible
for the struggle between conflicting ideas and for the seeming
"reversal" of his doctrine in T1 i 1 of 'lords . (Lj.) But
modifications in his later work, as for example, the notion
of an intellection, are a logical following out of ideas
entertained and interests evinced in the early work.
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A particularly fascinating fact about the earl;: American
philosopher Alexander Bryan Johnson is that he anticipated
ideas more than one hundred years before they came to play an
essential role in modem philosophical thought; yet his wc:\:
remained unrecognized until recent time 3. Perhaps Johnson's
ideas were too radical or, perhaps, since he was a banker ana
not a professional philosopher, he was not taken seriously by
his philosophic contemporaries. But whatever the reason for
his former noglect, today it is necessary to recognize and
appraise his ideas
Johnson discovered that nearly all erroneous speculations
are based on the attempt to acquire knowledge through language,
and to express and transmit in language the content of reality
«
This fallacy is caused by our perennial failure to understand
the powers of language; "our misapprehension of the nature of
language," according to Johnson, "has occasioned a greater waste
of time, and effort, and genius, than all the other mistakes and
delusions with which humanity has been afflicted,," To remedy
this affliction a reversal of the established relation botween
language and nature is required*, In Johnson's words such a
reversal amounts to "interpreting language by nature" and not,
a3 we are accustomed, "nature by language . " Thus Johnson's
intellectual revolution consists in the reversal of accepted
modes of acquiring knowledge and of alterations in linguistic
usage
The purpose of this paper is to analyse and assess this
revolution and to show that unforeseen difficulties, engendered
by Johnson's o\m ideas, necessitated a partial repudiation of
his radical doctrines. From his empirical epistemology and his
insights into the nature of language Johnson concluded that there
exist two types of knowledge j the first based on sense experience,
the second on language; and that the former is to be cultivated
rather than the latter. The depreciation of knowledge derived
from language, however, would havo involved not only the rejec-
tion of vacuous speculations but also theology and a great deal
of human learning, including Johnson's own doctrines. The conse-
quence of this paradox was a struggle between conflicting ideas
which begins in Johnson's Treatise and is resolved in his The
Meaning of Words
.

